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CAN PROSTITUTION LAW REFORM CURB SEX
TRAFFICKING? THEORY AND EVIDENCE ON SCALE,
SUBSTITUTION, AND REPLACEMENT EFFECTS
Simon Hedlin*
Sex trafficking, a pervasive problem in many parts of the world, has become
increasingly salient to policymakers and the general public. Activists, politicians,
and scholars continue to engage in debates about how best to curb it. This Article
discusses one especially contentious dimension of these debates: does banning prosti-
tution reduce sex trafficking? Or is legalizing prostitution the optimal approach?
Or is there a third, better way? Proceeding both theoretically and empirically, this
Article seeks to cast light on the relationship between different types of prostitution
laws and the prevalence of sex trafficking and human trafficking. It attempts to
make three contributions to the literature.
  First, it builds on existing theories of the link between the demand for purchased
sex and the supply of sex-trafficking victims to create a simple ordinal measure of
prostitution laws. This measure, which the Article dubs the Prostitution Law Index
(PLI), captures not only whether prostitution overall is legal or illegal, but whether
buying sex is legal or illegal and whether selling sex is legal or illegal, which better
reflects the actual cross-country variation in prostitution laws. The PLI takes into
account scale, substitution, and replacement effects in the market for prostitution,
where scale refers to increases in the prevalence of trafficking that are caused by
growth of the overall market for prostitution; substitution to decreases in trafficking
caused by current consumers who purchase sex with trafficking victims and, based
on the risk of criminal sanction, shift to instead purchasing sex with individuals
who voluntarily sell sex, thereby crowding out trafficking victims; and replacement
to decreases in trafficking caused by new voluntary sellers of sex who, incentivized
by changes in prostitution laws, enter the market and crowd out trafficking victims.
The PLI ranks prostitution laws across countries on a four-point scale (from 1 to
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4), based on their expected effectiveness (from least to most effective) in reducing sex
trafficking.
Second, the study uses a recent dataset provided by the European Union to map
the statistical relationship between PLI scores and prevalence of sex trafficking,
based on the Article’s theory of scale, substitution, and replacement effects. The
analysis suggests that there generally is an inverse relationship between a country’s
PLI score and the prevalence of trafficking in that country. Greater legislative ef-
forts to reduce scale and to increase substitution and replacement appear, on
average, to be associated with lower levels of sex trafficking.
Third, the Article presents a basic Difference-in-Differences analysis—on the
basis of extremely limited data and thus with an unusually large number of cave-
ats—of Norway’s 2009 prostitution law reform. Tentative results indicate that the
Norwegian reform, which made it legal to sell but illegal to buy sex, may potentially
have helped reduce the prevalence of trafficking there.
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INTRODUCTION
Sex trafficking typically refers to the “recruitment, transporta-
tion, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons” through force,
fraud, or coercion for the purpose of sexual exploitation.1 Because
sex trafficking, like human trafficking generally, is an underground
industry, it is hard to measure the true magnitude of the problem.2
The United Nations has estimated that, at any given time, 2.4 mil-
lion people around the world are being trafficked, eighty percent
of them for purposes of sexual exploitation.3 Even these numbers—
just like other existing figures on either human or sex trafficking,
whether higher4 or lower5—must be taken with a grain (or spoon-
ful) of salt.6 But even without perfect data, it seems clear that sex
1. See Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially
Women and Children, Supplementing the U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organ-
ized Crime, art 3(a), opened for signature Dec. 12, 2000, T.I.A.S. No. 13127, 2237 U.N.T.S. 319
(entered into force Dec. 25, 2003).
2. See, e.g., Seo-Young Cho et al., Does Legalized Prostitution Increase Human Trafficking?,
41 WORLD DEV. 69 (2013) (“One of the biggest challenges of doing research on human
trafficking is the scarcity of reliable and comparable data. Human trafficking is a clandestine,
criminal activity, with those being trafficked and involved in such activities being part of
‘hidden populations.’ Therefore, the true number of human trafficking victims is unknown.”
(citations omitted)).
3. The Associated Press, U.N.: 2.4 million human trafficking victims, USA TODAY (Apr. 4,
2012), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/story/2012-04-03/human-trafficking-
sex-UN/53982026/1.
4. See, e.g., INT’L LABOUR ORG., ILO GLOBAL ESTIMATE OF FORCED LABOUR: RESULTS AND
METHODOLOGY 13 (2012) (“The ILO estimates that 20.9 million people are victims of forced
labour globally, trapped in jobs into which they were coerced or deceived and which they
cannot leave. Human trafficking can also be regarded as forced labour, and so this estimate
captures the full realm of human trafficking for labour and sexual exploitation, or what some
call ‘modern-day slavery.’”).
5. See Ian McColl, Human Trafficking . . . A Global Problem, 60 MERCER L. REV. 792 (2009)
(citing an estimate of international trafficking only, which by comparison is relatively low:
“about six to eight hundred thousand people, mostly women and children, are trafficked
across international borders”).
6. See, e.g., Niklas Jakobsson & Andreas Kotsadam, The Law and Economics of International
Sex Slavery: Prostitution Laws and Trafficking for Sexual Exploitation, 35 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 93
(2013) (“The available data on trafficking is limited and unsatisfactory in many ways and we
strongly encourage efforts to collect better data.”).
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trafficking is now widespread and substantial throughout many
parts of the world, including Europe and the United States.7
While trafficking is above all an issue of human rights, it may
nonetheless be worthwhile to view sex trafficking through an eco-
nomic lens. A better understanding of the economic forces driving
modern trafficking may allow policymakers to devise and imple-
ment more effective responses. Because the commercial sex
industry as a whole is highly profitable, criminals have powerful in-
centives to traffic individuals for the purpose of sexual
exploitation.8 Economics may therefore have important lessons to
teach about how to counter, and how not to counter, sex trafficking.
Simply put, prostitution can be seen as a market: the demand
side comprises individuals who purchase sex, while the supply side
includes both voluntary prostitutes and sex-trafficking victims.
Some countries have tried to combat prostitution—and, by exten-
sion, sex trafficking9—by focusing exclusively on the supply side of
the market. In Romania, for instance, it was previously illegal to sell
sex but legal to buy it.10 Law enforcement agencies were thus only
arresting individuals who were selling sex, while leaving the de-
mand side untouched.
In other countries, such as America (a few counties in Nevada
aside), it is illegal both to sell and to buy sex.11 In theory, such laws
aim at eradicating a market for paid sex, including both voluntary
prostitution and trafficking, by targeting both supply and demand.
7. See, e.g., Lenora C. Babb, Utah’s Misguided Approach to the Problem of Sex Trafficking: A
Call for Reform, 14 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 277, 282 (2012); Joyce Outshoorn, The Political Debates on
Prostitution and Trafficking of Women, 12 SOC. POL. 141, 141–42 (2005); Donna M. Hughes, The
“Natasha” Trade: The Transnational Shadow Market of Trafficking in Women, 53 J. INT’L AFF. 625,
625–26 (2000); Lionel Barber, FT Season Appeal: Letter from the editor, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 2,
2015), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/5434fa74-9518-11e5-ac15-0f7f7945adba.html (writ-
ing about human trafficking, including sex trafficking, that the “slavery trade is as ancient as
it is barbaric. The fact that it has not been eradicated demands urgent action.”).
8. See, e.g., MEREDITH DANK ET AL., ESTIMATING THE SIZE AND STRUCTURE OF THE UNDER-
GROUND COMMERICAL SEX ECONOMY IN EIGHT MAJOR US CITIES 1–2 (2014); KEVIN BALES,
DISPOSABLE PEOPLE: NEW SLAVERY IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 3–4 (3d ed. 2012).
9. Since sex trafficking is essentially a subset of the total market for prostitution.
10. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, H.R. AND LAB., 2008 HUMAN RIGHTS
REPORT: ROMANIA 12 (2009), http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/eur/119100.htm
(“Prostitution is illegal but was prevalent. Police generally limited their intervention to fining
prostitutes for loitering or disturbing the peace. According to local media, there were anec-
dotal reports that sex tourism existed in Bucharest and other major cities. The law does not
provide punishment for clients of prostitutes, unless the prostitute was a minor and the client
admitted knowing that fact before the act.”).
11. See Ronald Weitzer, Sex Work: Paradigms and Policies, in SEX FOR SALE: PROSTITUTION,
PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE SEX INDUSTRY 21 (Ronald Weitzer ed., 2d ed. 2010) (“Prostitution is
treated in a more uniform manner in the United States, with criminalization being the reign-
ing policy. This means that solicitation to engage in an act of prostitution is illegal, except in
certain counties in Nevada, where about 30 legal brothels exist.”).
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In practice, though, most prostitution-related arrests in the United
States are made against sellers—not buyers—of sex.12 Hard num-
bers on the seller-buyer arrest disparity are exceptionally difficult, if
not outright impossible, to come by,13 but some have estimated that
as many as nine out of every ten prostitution-related arrests in the
U.S. are of sellers, not buyers.14 De facto, then, law enforcement
agencies in countries adopting either the (former) Romanian or
the American approach have tended to focus on controlling the
supply side rather than the demand side of the sexual services
market.
Other countries, such as the Netherlands15 and Germany,16 have
opted for a third approach. Both countries have legalized prostitu-
tion and related activities,17 such as pimping and running
brothels.18 Under this approach, the state makes no effort to deter
people from selling or buying sex. Instead, law enforcement agen-
cies focus on rooting out trafficking and other exploitative forms of
prostitution, and may use resources that would otherwise have been
devoted to investigating, arresting, and prosecuting buyers or sell-
ers of sex to target traffickers, and other exploitative suppliers,
instead.19 Proponents of this approach tend to believe that it is,
above all, the criminalization of prostitution that makes trafficking
12. See, e.g., Moira Heiges, From the Inside Out: Reforming State and Local Prostitution Enforce-
ment to Combat Sex Trafficking in the United States and Abroad, 94 MINN. L. REV. 428, 437 (2009)
(“Unfortunately, rather than focusing on reducing the market for sex trafficking, police,
prosecutors, and courts have typically viewed pimps and purchasers as trivial or derivative
offenders, while targeting prostituting persons for arrest and prosecution.” (footnote
omitted)).
13. A case in point: the author has submitted FOIA requests to local law enforcement
agencies in an attempt to gather data on the ratio of arrests of sellers of sex to arrests of
buyers—so far without success. Typically, local law enforcement responds by stating that such
data is not collected and therefore does not exist.
14. See The Economist, Selling Sex: Hold the Backpage, THE ECONOMIST (July 18, 2015)
(noting that “Cook County now arrests more buyers of sex than sellers. In America as a
whole, by contrast, more than 90% of those arrested for taking part in the business are
prostitutes.”).
15. See generally ANNELIES L. DAALDER, PROSTITUTION IN THE NETHERLANDS SINCE THE
LIFTING OF THE BROTHEL BAN 12–13 (2007).
16. See GERMAN FEDERAL MINISTRY FOR FAMILY AFFAIRS, SENIOR CITIZENS, WOMEN AND
YOUTH, REPORT BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ON THE IMPACT OF THE ACT REGULATING THE
LEGAL SITUATION OF PROSTITUTES 9 (2007) [hereinafter FEDERAL MINISTRY].
17. See, e.g., Alissa J. Rubin, To Discourage Prostitution, France Passes Bill That Penalizes Cli-
ents, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/07/world/europe/to-
discourage-prostitution-france-passes-bill-that-penalizes-clients.html (“The Netherlands and
Germany take a different approach, regulating prostitution as a business and requiring
health checks and other measures to protect both the prostitutes and their customers.”).
18. See id.; DAALDER, supra note 15.
19. This view assumes that prostitution is not inherently exploitative and that consensual
prostitution should not be prohibited; this stands in stark contrast, of course, to the neo-
abolitionist position. See infra note 24.
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attractive in the first place, and that permitting prostitution will
therefore help reduce the prevalence20 of trafficking.21
A fourth legislative approach to prostitution—one that has also
been claimed to reduce sex trafficking—is to criminalize only the
purchasing of sex. This model (the Demand Model) exclusively
targets the demand side of the commercial-sex market. First intro-
duced in Sweden in 1999,22 similar laws are now on the books in a
number of countries, including Norway, Canada, Iceland, Northern
Ireland, and France.23 One reason the Demand Model has grown in
The legalization approach practiced in Germany and the Netherlands, or the decriminal-
ization route taken by New Zealand, and, recently, by Romania, are generally favored by non-
abolitionists, who also agree with the notion that a clearer distinction between voluntary and
forced prostitution should be drawn in order to focus the attention on the victims of sexual
exploitation. See, e.g., Alison Brysk, Sex as Slavery? Understanding Private Wrongs, 12 HUM. RTS.
REV. 260 (2011) (“Anti-trafficking policies depart from an assumption of free individual
women or parents on behalf of children, who are coerced or egregiously misled to be smug-
gled across borders, and then continuously pressured and abused to engage in sex work. It is
assumed that such women were not and would not engage voluntarily in sex work, that other
employment options do not exist or are not exploitive, and that trafficking is uniquely harm-
ful due to its nature. [However,] anti-trafficking policies framed to protect ‘innocent’ women
from sexual slavery ignore or slight prior sex workers or other women who migrate volunta-
rily to engage in sex work but are subsequently exploited.”). Proponents contend that
making prostitution permissible would make it possible for law enforcement agencies to pri-
oritize going after traffickers instead of arresting those in the market for purchased sex who
are not exploiting other individuals.
20. Prevalence in the context of this Article refers to the number of individuals who are
identified or presumed to be victims of trafficking one or more times in a given year relative
to the country’s population. This is distinctly different from measuring the proportion of the
sellers of sex that have been victimized. It is also notably different from measuring incidence,
which would refer to the number of discrete victimization events that take place in a given
year. While incidence might be a valuable complement to prevalence for the purpose of
measuring human suffering, it would be even harder to get reliable data on incidence.
Unless the Article specifies otherwise, all references to increases, decreases, etc. in traf-
ficking are to be taken as increases, decreases, etc. in the prevalence of trafficking.
The two primary outcome variables in this article are the number of sex trafficking victims
per million people in a given country in a given year and the number of victims of all human
trafficking per million people in a given country in a given year.
21. See, e.g., Alison Murray, Debt Bondage and Trafficking, in GLOBAL SEX WORKERS:
RIGHTS, RESISTANCE, AND REDEFINITION 60 (Kamala Kempadoo & Jo Doezema eds., 1998) (“It
is the prohibition of prostitution and restrictions on travel which attract organized crime and
create the possibilities for large profits, as well as creating the prostitutes’ need for protection
and assistance.”).
22. Donna M. Hughes, The “Natasha” Trade: The Transnational Shadow Market of Traffick-
ing in Women, 53 J. INT’L AFF. 625, 649 (2000) (“This new law is the first that aims to protect
women from violence by holding men accountable and thereby addressing the demand for
women to be trafficked for prostitution.”).
23. See, e.g., Mac McClelland, Is Prostitution Just Another Job?, NEW YORK MAGAZINE (Mar.
21, 2016), http://nymag.com/thecut/2016/03/sex-workers-legalization-c-v-r.html (“These
opponents to decriminalization support the ‘Nordic model,’ which punishes buyers, broth-
els, and pimps but not the sex workers themselves, a system pioneered by Sweden that has
since been adopted in some form in Iceland, Norway, Northern Ireland, and Canada. The
idea is to ultimately end the trade without harming the women, who are seen as its victims, by
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popularity is that, to some, it appears compelling in theory: a focus
on the demand side of the sex trade has the potential to shrink the
market for prostitution and thereby reduce the profitability of sex
trafficking, which means that traffickers should supply fewer victims
to the market.24
The rationale for targeting demand instead of supply is simple.
The idea is that there will be someone who is willing to supply the
market as long as demand exists25 in the form of individuals willing
to pay hefty sums26 for sexual services.27 Proponents of the Demand
targeting the more powerful economic agents, namely men.”); Rubin, supra note 17 (“After a
debate lasting nearly two and a half years, France’s Parliament on Wednesday approved a bill
to discourage prostitution by penalizing those who pay for sex, following the example of
Sweden and Norway. . . . Under the new law, first time offenders will pay a fine of C=  1,500, or
about $1,700, if they “solicit, accept or obtain relations of a sexual nature” from a prostitute
in exchange for money. The fine can rise to C=  3,750 (about $4,300) for repeat offenders.
Convicted offenders may also have to attend classes to learn about the vulnerability of women
in the sex trade. There is also the option for a settlement in which the offender could be
ordered to take classes in lieu of the fine. The law also repeals an existing measure that
penalizes solicitation by prostitutes, which many viewed as having forced prostitutes to work
in more desolate neighborhoods or outside of city centers where they were less likely to be
arrested by the police, but also where they were less safe.”).
24. In the scholarly and public debates, this approach tends to be favored by many neo-
abolitionists, who assert that all forms of prostitution, whether voluntary or not, are inher-
ently exploitative. See, e.g., Marie Segrave, Order at the Border: The Repatriation of Victims of
Trafficking, 32 WOMEN’S STUD. INT’L F. 251, 252 (2009) (“At a most basic level a neo-abolition-
ist perspective is characterised by its identification of prostitution as one of the more serious/
extreme instances of the oppression and sexual exploitation of women that exists within a
patriarchal social system.”). See also Janie A. Chuang, Rescuing Trafficking From Ideological Cap-
ture: Prostitution Reform and Anti-Trafficking Law and Policy, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1655, 1664
(2010); Jane Scoular & Anna Carline, A Critical Account of a ‘creeping Neo-abolitionism’: Regulat-
ing Prostitution in England and Wales, 14 CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 608, 609 (2014). For an
account that goes into greater depth of different theories about prostitution and commercial
sexual exploitation, see MELISSA HOPE DITMORE, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PROSTITUTION AND SEX
WORK, VOLUME 2 (2006).
25. See, e.g., Masud Ali, Assessment of the Demand-Supply Interface of Trafficking and Commer-
cial Sexual Exploitation, in HUMAN TRAFFICKING: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH 74 (Christine
Aghazarm & Frank Laczko eds., 2008) (arguing that “the demand-side actors are not passive
consumers of services delivered by trafficked individuals; rather the demand-side actors are
often active agents in shaping the supply of sexual services which can only be met by traf-
ficked individuals”). Nonetheless, it must be noted that demand is not the single root cause
of human trafficking; other factors are essential, too. See, e.g., Janie Chuang, Beyond a Snap-
shot: Preventing Human Trafficking in the Global Economy, 13 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 137,
160 (2006) (explaining that human trafficking also has its root causes “in poverty, unemploy-
ment, discrimination, and violence against women”).
26. See, e.g., DANK ET AL., supra note 8, at 61 (“In Miami, online escort services are typi-
cally described as ‘high-end’ in that the prices charged are higher—$600 to $1,000 per
hour—and therefore the customers tend to be wealthier.”).
27. It is, of course, possible to imagine a theoretical situation where the market for paid
sex is eliminated by imposing such extreme penalties on suppliers that there will be no sup-
ply even if there is a substantial level of demand. But this would not only seem unrealistic,
given how much more severely suppliers presumably would have to be punished to be de-
terred; it would also likely be extremely expensive, since deterrence is based on both severity
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Model argue that it is unrealistic to think that trafficking can be
successfully fought without substantially reducing, if not eliminat-
ing, the demand side of the commercial market in sex.28 Because
sex trafficking can be very lucrative,29 and because actors in the
market, such as pimps, perceive the risk of being caught as rela-
tively low,30 proponents of this fourth approach have argued that
reducing the demand for paid sex may make it much less profitable
for traffickers to stay in business. If fewer people purchase sex, pro-
ponents contend, traffickers will traffic fewer human beings.31
Supporters of the Demand Model claim that criminalizing only
the act of buying sex focuses law enforcement resources on reduc-
ing the demand for purchased sex. Yet, in some tellings at least, the
Model is also based on the notion that attempting to reduce sexual
exploitation by criminalizing individuals who sell sex may well
prove counterproductive.32 While criminalizing the sale of sex may
discourage voluntary prostitutes from entering the prostitution in-
dustry, the sex-trafficking victims who are part of the market for
prostitution are forced, deceived, or coerced into selling sex. Ar-
guably, then, the risk of legal sanctions will not affect their behavior
in the market for prostitution. Criminalizing the sale may not have
an effect on traffickers either. Trafficking is already illegal in most
countries, and traffickers are typically not personally selling sex.
Such a legislative approach may, therefore, result in both increased
arrests of trafficking victims and an increase in the proportion of
individuals in the market for prostitution who are subject to force,
of punishment and certainty of punishment, the latter of which depends in large part on law
enforcement resources.
28. See, e.g., Janice G. Raymond, Ten Reasons for Not Legalizing Prostitution And a Legal
Response to the Demand for Prostitution, 2 J. TRAUMA PRAC. (2003).
29. See Hughes, supra note 22, at 650 (“The trafficking of women for purposes of sexual
exploitation has become a highly profitable shadow market for organized crime networks.”).
30. See DANK ET AL., supra note 8, at 3 (“While pimps have varying levels of knowledge
regarding law enforcement tactics and sentencing surrounding sex trafficking, offenders be-
lieved that pimping was less risky than other crimes, including drug trafficking.”).
31. See, e.g., Max Waltman, Prohibiting Sex Purchasing and Ending Trafficking: The Swedish
Prostitution Law, 33 MICH. J. INT’L L. 133, 136 (2011) (writing that “any effective approach
against sex trafficking must also reduce prostitution and the demand for it”). However, it
must be noted that it is possible that traffickers would respond to a decrease in demand by
reducing the intensive margin rather than the extensive margin. In other words, rather than
exploiting fewer human beings, traffickers might simply choose to reduce the average num-
ber of transactions per victim. But, assuming there are fixed costs associated with trafficking
human beings, profit-maximizing traffickers should reduce the extensive margin.
32. This argument unites those who favor the Demand Model and those who support
legalization or decriminalization, as neither camp wants to criminalize the act of selling sex.
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fraud, or coercion.33 In the worst-case scenario, advocates of the
Model might contend, criminalizing the sale of sex could even lead
to more sex trafficking than if selling sex were legal. If the individu-
als who are selling sex voluntarily are discouraged from doing so by
the criminalization of selling, supply may fall, which could drive up
the purchase price of sex. Enticed by greater profits, traffickers
might respond to the price increase by trafficking even more
victims.
While some find the Demand Model intriguing in theory, there
is an unfortunate lack of empirical evidence on its real-world im-
pact. At present, there is little data either to support or to challenge
the claim that this type of prostitution law does the most to reduce
sex trafficking.34 Nor is it well understood how exactly the analysis
of supply and demand bears on the relationship between prostitu-
tion laws and sex trafficking. This is not surprising; indeed, there
exists only limited literature on the general relationship between
prostitution laws and sex trafficking.35 This Article, by using new
data from the European Union (EU), attempts to shed some light
on both on this general relationship and on the particular relation-
ship of the Demand Model to sex trafficking.
More specifically, the Article seeks to make three contributions.
First, it builds on existing theories of the link between demand for
purchased sex and the supply of sex-trafficking victims to create a
very simple ordinal measure of prostitution laws, the Prostitution
Law Index (PLI).36 The PLI is developed by scoring laws on a four-
point scale according to how effective a theoretical model predicts
them to be at reducing the prevalence of sex trafficking. To make
such predictions, the Article uses some basic assumptions about
scale, substitution, and replacement effects. Second, it uses a new
dataset, collected across the European Union, to study the relation-
ship between a country’s PLI score and the prevalence of sex and
33. See Babb, supra note 7, at 293 (“Utah’s sex trafficking laws are seriously inadequate,
and [given that the amendments were explicitly explained as a tool making it easier to arrest
the prostitutes] the new sexual solicitation statute only makes a bad situation worse.”).
34. Unfortunately, a lack of sound empirical evidence plagues trafficking research in
general. See, e.g., Sheldon X. Zhang, Beyond the ‘Natasha’ story—a review and critique of current
research on sex trafficking, 10 GLOBAL CRIME 178 (2009) (“Much of our current knowledge,
including statistical estimates and characteristics of the trafficking business, derives from a
handful of reports issued by government and non-government agencies. With few empirical
studies available, imagination seems to have filled the gaps of our knowledge.”).
35. See infra Part I (discussing the limitations of the existing literature).
36. See infra Part I.
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human trafficking in that country.37 Third, it develops a very lim-
ited Difference-in-Differences38 analysis of the effects of Norway’s
2009 adoption of a version of the Demand Model.39
The Article concludes that there appears to be a significant nega-
tive correlation between PLI scores and prevalence of sex
trafficking and human trafficking within European Union member
states. That is to say, decreasing the scale effect and increasing the
substitution and replacement effects—i.e., raising a country’s Pros-
titution Law Index score—appears to generally be associated with
lower levels of trafficking.
Furthermore, a Difference-in-Differences analysis of Norway’s re-
cent introduction of demand-focused prostitution laws provides
some suggestive evidence that the country’s prostitution law reform
may have perhaps reduced the prevalence of sex trafficking there.
Because the data is very limited, however, this finding must be inter-
preted with a great deal of caution, and is merely potentially
indicative, at best.40 Future studies will hopefully examine this possi-
bility in more detail, and will likely find more useful the Difference-
in-Differences framework rather than the statistical result itself.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I reviews some of the ex-
isting literature on prostitution laws, sex trafficking, and human
trafficking. Part II sets up the Article’s basic theoretical framework
for the analysis of prostitution laws. It looks at such laws through
the lens of the demand for purchased sex and the supply of sex
trafficking, based on scale, substitution, and replacement effects. It
also presents a simple way of categorizing prostitution laws in terms
of supply and demand, which yields four distinct categories of laws.
Part III discusses the new, consolidated European Union dataset on
sex trafficking and human trafficking, and introduces the Prostitu-
tion Law Index as a means of quantifying prostitution laws. The PLI
37. See infra Part III.A.
38. See generally Martin Gaynor et al., Death by Market Power: Reform, Competition, and Pa-
tient Outcomes in the National Health Service, 5 AM. ECON. J. 134, 141 (providing an example of a
Difference-in-Differences analysis on a different topic: “Our goal is to test the hypothesis that
the pro-competition policy improved hospital quality. To do this we exploit the variation in
market structure across hospitals and examine whether quality is higher for hospitals in less
concentrated markets after the introduction of competition. This is a difference-in-differ-
ences (DiD) approach. The simplest DiD strategy compares two groups over two time
periods, where a treatment group is exposed in the second period and a control group is not
exposed to the policy in either period.”).
39. See infra Part V.C.
40. The many caveats notwithstanding, the author strongly believes that the method it-
self is sound. And regardless of whether future research validates or vitiates the particular
results adduced here, the author equally strongly believes that the use of quasi-experimental
methods in future research on the causal relationship of prostitution laws to sex trafficking
holds the promise of high returns.
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ranks laws on a four-point scale based on how well those laws may
be expected to combat sex trafficking. To do so, it uses some basic
assumptions about supply and demand in the prostitution market.
Part IV presents the regression models employed, and discusses a
number of important assumptions, limitations, and caveats regard-
ing the research design. Part V presents the results of the cross-
country regression and Difference-in-Differences analyses. A brief
conclusion summarizes the findings, reiterates important limita-
tions and caveats, and lays out some directions for future research.
I. EXISTING RESEARCH ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
PROSTITUTION AND SEX TRAFFICKING
The view that prostitution is inherently harmful41 is neither new42
nor marginal; despite much sharp criticism, it remains an influen-
tial43 and commonly held view among academics and the broader
public.44 Similarly influential and debated is the theory that it is
necessary to curb prostitution in order to reduce sex trafficking and
human trafficking.45 However, actual empirical evidence is scarce,
and the link between prostitution and trafficking has been debated
for decades without nearing anything resembling consensus.46
41. See generally Ronald Weitzer, The Social Construction of Sex Trafficking: Ideology and Insti-
tutionalization of a Moral Crusade, 35 POL. SOC. 447, 451 (2007) (citing advocates who believe
that prostitution “is evil by definition”).
42. See, e.g., FRANCIS WILLIAM NEWMAN, THE CURE OF THE GREAT SOCIAL EVIL, WITH SPE-
CIAL REFERENCE TO RECENT LAWS DELUSIVELY CALLED CONTAGIOUS DISEASES’ ACTS 3 (1869)
(describing contemporary views on prostitution in England as follows: “Under the name of
the Great Social Evil our newspapers have for years alluded to an awful vice, too evidently of
wide prevalence.”).
43. See, e.g., Ole Martin Moen, Is Prostitution Harmful?, J. MEDICAL ETHICS 1 (2012)
(“Most of us believe that prostitution is harmful. We believe that we are harmed if we sell sex
and, perhaps, harmed if we buy sex. This harm, moreover, we consider to be of serious pro-
portions. Selling sex is not regarded as on par with eating too much chocolate or getting a
bad grade. Rather, it is regarded as so harmful that if it is ever permissible and appropriate to
engage in prostitution, it must be as the last option available in a situation where the alterna-
tive is to suffer a life-threatening harm (such as starvation). Opinion polls support this line of
thought.”).
44. Cf., Ronald Weitzer, The Mythology of Prostitution: Advocacy Research and Public Policy, 7
SEXUALITY RESEARCH & SOC. POL’Y 15 (2010) (“Knowledge regarding sex work is increasingly
being distorted by a group of influential activists, organizations, and some academics who
regard the sex industry as a universally harmful institution.”).
45. See, e.g., McClelland, supra note 23 (citing Cherie Jimenez, who runs the Eva Center,
a sex-work exit program in Boston: “You can’t end the trafficking piece without addressing it
as a whole thing, as a sex trade. Decriminalization, which is what Amnesty is calling for, would
make this an open market.”).
46. See generally STEPHANIE A. LIMONCELLI, THE POLITICS OF TRAFFICKING: THE FIRST INTER-
NATIONAL MOVEMENT TO COMBAT THE SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF WOMEN (2010) (providing a
comprehensive overview).
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Already in 1949, the United Nations International Convention
for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons called for countries to
reduce prostitution within their borders.47 This call has resonated
in academic and policy circles, and over the years many neo-aboli-
tionists have attempted to give empirical backing to their views.
One scholar, for example, has argued that “evidence seems to show
that legalized sex industries actually result in increased trafficking
to meet the demand for women to be used in the legal sex indus-
tries.”48 Another has made the stronger claim that “[w]herever
prostitution is legalized, trafficking to sex industry marketplaces in
that region increases.”49 And the United States Department of
State, in its annual report on human trafficking, has written that
“[s]ex trafficking would not exist without the demand for commer-
cial sex flourishing around the world.”50 Such views seem to suggest
that countries can best fight sex trafficking by eliminating the do-
mestic market for all commercial sex, including voluntary
prostitution.
Those who think that prostitution is inherently harmful and
those who believe that sex trafficking is inevitable so long as de-
mand for commercial sex is high may thus end up taking the same
policy position: prostitution should be illegal. But many disagree
with the argument that permitting prostitution increases traffick-
ing.51 The Bureau of the Dutch National Rapporteur on Trafficking
in Human Beings has suggested that legalized prostitution benefits
voluntary prostitutes, who may replace trafficking victims in the
market, and at the same time makes trafficked women less attractive
to buyers—both of which would reduce sex trafficking.52 In the
same vein, one study found that New Zealand’s 2003 reform of its
prostitution laws, which among other things decriminalized prosti-
tution, helped improve the relationship between police and
47. See Outshoorn, supra note 7, at 142.
48. Hughes, supra note 22, at 651.
49. Melissa Farley, Theory Versus Reality: Commentary on Four Articles About Trafficking for
Prostitution, 32 WOMEN’S STUD. INT’L F. 311, 313 (2009).
50. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 27 (2007).
51. See, e.g., Weitzer, supra note 41, at 457 (“The causal link between legal prostitution
and trafficking has not been empirically established. There is no evidence, for instance, that
women are being coercively trafficked into Nevada’s legal brothels . . . Rather than being a
magnet attracting migrants into a country, it appears that legal prostitution may help reduce
trafficking due to enhanced government regulation and oversight of the legal sector.”).
52. See ANNA G. KORVINUS, THE DUTCH NATIONAL RAPPORTEUR ON TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN
BEINGS, TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS 16 (2005). See also Segrave, supra note 24, at 253 (dis-
cussing the argument that “legalization of sex work, better working conditions and benefits
and protection for sex workers will combat trafficking”).
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individuals who sell sex.53 Better communication could reduce the
prevalence of trafficking, as sellers become more likely to report
both abusive buyers (who may be more likely to pay for sex with
trafficking victims) and exploitative pimps (who may be traffick-
ers).54 Another argument in favor of making prostitution legal
notes that criminalization is precisely what attracts traffickers in the
first place. Kamala Kempadoo has written that
Traffickers take advantage of the illegality of commercial sex
work and migration, and are able to exert an undue amount of
power and control over [migrants] . . . . In such cases, it is the
laws that prevent legal commercial sex work and immigration
that form the major obstacles.55
To assess the merits of these two opposing views on legalization,
one would do well to inquire into the actual effects, if any, of prosti-
tution laws upon trafficking, independent of anti-trafficking laws
proper. Does it actually matter whether prostitution is legal or
illegal?
One way that prostitution laws may impact trafficking is by affect-
ing the availability of sexual services. If such laws can meaningfully
affect either the demand or supply of commercial sex, it is plausible
to believe that such laws can also change the extent to which indi-
viduals are coerced or deceived into selling sex.
Some might respond that the prostitution industry does not op-
erate like a normal market. And it is undoubtedly true that
prostitution differs from many other service industries, because of
the associated stigma. In a 2007 study, the German government
found that fewer than eight percent of individuals who sell sex are
“officially insured as prostitutes”; although this may result simply
from the fact that many sellers have other jobs, it could also indi-
cate that the stigma attached to the profession makes sellers less
likely to disclose that they engage in prostitution.56 In New Zealand,
where prostitution has been decriminalized, reports still emerge
that sellers are subject to “continuing stigma” and “harassment by
53. See Lynzi Armstrong, From Law Enforcement to Protection? Interactions between Sex Workers
and Police in a Decriminalized Street-Based Sex Industry, BRITISH J. CRIMINOLOGY (Feb. 18, 2016),
http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2016/03/11/bjc.azw019.
54. Abigail Hall Blanco, Idealism blurs truth about legalizing sex work, Las Vegas Sun (July 8,
2012, 2:00 AM), http://lasvegassun.com/news/2016/jul/08/idealism-blurs-truth-about-legal-
izing-sex-work/ (arguing that after New Zealand’s prostitution law reform, “it was easier for
sex workers to report abuse and for police to prosecute sex crimes”).
55. Kamala Kempadoo, Introduction: Globalizing Sex Workers’ Rights, in GLOBAL SEX WORK-
ERS: RIGHTS, RESISTANCE, AND REDEFINITION 17 (Kamala Kempadoo & Jo Doezema eds., 1998).
56. See e.g., FEDERAL MINISTRY, supra note 16, at 26.
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the general public.”57 In other ways, though, the market for prosti-
tution does resemble that of other service industries. For example,
platforms in at least some countries allow buyers to recommend
and rate prostitution businesses as though they were hairdressers or
restaurants.58
The argument that permitting prostitution distorts the market in
favor of those who sell sexual services by choice rather than by force
does imply that legalization or decriminalization would lower the
prevalence of trafficking. Both supply-side effects and consumer
preferences may play a significant role in reducing trafficking.59
Still, others would contend that scale of demand also plays a crucial
role; if more people want to buy sex or are willing to pay more for
it, the argument goes, then, ceteris paribus, one may expect more
trafficking, and more victims, as a result.60
While there are several facially plausible arguments cutting both
ways, the empirical evidence on the relationship between prostitu-
tion laws and human trafficking is mixed. The results of one study
suggested that prostitution laws have no positive or negative effect
on human-trafficking inflows to European countries.61 Similarly, an-
other study, using a global sample of countries, initially found that
prostitution laws have no effect on trafficking flows between pairs of
countries.62 However, when that same study introduced additional
57. GILLIAN M. ABEL ET AL., THE IMPACT OF THE PROSTITUTION REFORM ACT ON THE
HEALTH AND SAFETY PRACTICES OF SEX WORKERS 11 (2007).
58. Websites now exist where customers can rate the individuals from whom they
purchase sex—a practice similar to posting business reviews on Yelp or TripAdvisor. See, e.g.,
Christine Milrod & Martin A. Monto, The Hobbyist and the Girlfriend Experience: Behaviors and
Preferences of Male Customers of Internet Sexual Service Providers, 33 DEVIANT BEHAVIOR 792, 796
(2012) (“The review website of interest to this study was TheEroticReview.com, referred to as
TER among its users and ranked among the top 1,500 most visited websites in the United
States (Alexa.com 11 October 2011). According to information found on the website, TER
has over 1,000,000 registered members. The site receives between 250,000–300,000 unique
Internet visitors daily and contains more than 800,000 reviews including the names and con-
tact information of 75,000–100,000 ISSP or simply ‘providers,’ another name for prostitutes
and sexual massage practitioners who can be located by using the Internet.”).
59. However, some would argue that there may be other important demand-side effects
of legalization that are unrelated to either supply or consumer preferences. For instance, if it
is legal to purchase sex, buyers may be keener on reporting suspected trafficking cases to the
police, which would suggest that criminalizing prostitution could risk increasing trafficking
prevalence. See, e.g., GLOBAL NETWORK OF SEX WORK PROJECTS, THE CRIMINALIZATION OF CLI-
ENTS 5 (2011) (writing that when prostitution is criminalized “a client encountering a sex
worker who has been coerced, or is in danger, is unlikely to report it to the police for fear of
incriminating himself”).
60. See, e.g., Cho et al., supra note 2 at 67, 69.
61. Diego Hernandez & Alexandra Rudolph, Modern Day Slavery: What Drives Human-
Trafficking in Europe?, 38 EUR. J. POL. ECON. 118 (2011).
62. Randall Akee et al., Transnational Trafficking, Law Enforcement and Victim Protection: A
Middleman’s Perspective, IZA DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 6226, Dec. 2011, at 25.
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variables for the purpose of estimating the causal impact, it found
that prohibiting prostitution increases trafficking.63
In sharp contrast, an analysis of European countries found legal-
ized prostitution positively correlated to increases in human
trafficking.64 This conclusion is consistent with that of another
global study, which found that, on average, countries where prosti-
tution is legal have a higher prevalence of human trafficking than
countries where prostitution is illegal.65 The findings also align with
the results of a detailed report on national prostitution laws, which
suggested that stricter prostitution laws are associated with lower
rates of human trafficking.66
II. THEORY
This Part develops a basic model for analyzing the relationship
between prostitution laws and sex trafficking through an economic
lens. Although the model relies on numerous assumptions, some of
which may be considered unrealistic, and most of which are not
easily testable on the basis of current evidence, it provides a useful
framework for thinking about why different types of prostitution
laws may be associated with different levels of sex trafficking.
63. Id. at 29. This result supports the line of reasoning proposed by many non-abolition-
ists. See supra note 19.
64. Jakobsson & Kotsadam, supra note 6, at 16–17 (“Using cross country data we find
clear support for our theoretical predictions: trafficking of persons for commercial sexual
exploitation is least prevalent in countries where prostitution is illegal, most prevalent in
countries where prostitution is legalized, and in between in those countries where prostitu-
tion is legal but procuring illegal.”).
65. Cho et al., supra note 2 at 75–76 (“Our quantitative empirical analysis for a cross-
section of up to 150 countries shows that the scale effect dominates the substitution effect.
On average, countries with legalized prostitution experience a larger degree of reported
human trafficking inflows.”).
However, it must be noted that the way in which the authors defined the substitution
effect was notably different from the definition used in this Article. Id. at 69 (“The full answer
to the question depends on what happens to the composition of prostitutes and whether any
substitution effect away from trafficked prostitutes (toward domestic prostitutes or foreign
prostitutes legally residing and working in the country) is stronger than the scale effect.
Under conditions of illegality, a certain share of prostitutes will consist of trafficked individu-
als, given the difficulties in recruiting individuals willing to voluntarily work in such an illegal
market. This share of trafficked prostitutes is likely to fall after legalization. Sex businesses
wishing to take advantage of the legality of prostitution (instead of remaining illegal) would
want to recruit more national citizens or foreigners legally residing with a work permit in the
country since employing trafficked foreign prostitutes (or, for that matter, illegally residing
foreign prostitutes that were not trafficked) endangers their newly achieved legal status.”
(footnote omitted)).
66. ANDREA DI NICOLA ET AL., STUDY ON NATIONAL LEGISLATION ON PROSTITUTION 132
(2005).
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In addition, the model helps frame and set expectations for the
empirical analysis presented in Part V, which attempts to analyze
which types of prostitution laws are associated with lower levels of
trafficking. Instead of leaving those statistical showings simply to
speak for themselves, the Article, in this Part, adds context and de-
velops predictions regarding the association between prostitution
laws and the prevalence of trafficking. Because the preliminary re-
sults presented in Part V partially confirm the predictions
developed here, at least some elements of the theoretical model
may turn out to be accurate, and are worthy of further inquiry.
A. Scale, Substitution, and Replacement Effects in the Market for
Prostitution
To explore the theory of the relationship between prostitution
generally and the subset thereof that constitutes sex trafficking, this
Article will start by considering a country with a fixed population
and a single market for prostitution.67 We assume that economic
agents in this market fall into one of only four categories:68 1) indi-
viduals who purchase sex; 2) individuals who voluntarily sell sexual
services; 3) traffickers who use coercion, fraud, or force to make
other individuals sell sex; and 4) victims of sex trafficking.
Imagine, first, the following scenario: it is illegal both to sell and
to buy sex; human trafficking is illegal; and purchasing sex with
victims of trafficking is, and remains, illegal regardless of changes to
the prostitution laws.69 Assume that some proportion of sellers or
buyers is deterred from being active in the market when selling or
buying sex, respectively, is illegal; that law enforcement agencies
67. This approach is inspired in part by the steps outlined in Cho et al., supra note 2.
68. Although the potential impact (positive or negative) of pimping and brothel-owning
on the prevalence of sex trafficking is an intriguing question, this study does not make these
two factors into variables, simply because that exclusion limits the scope of the analysis. The
limitation allows the fourfold division of economic agents.
69. The assumption that it is always illegal to pay for sex with trafficking victims makes it
easier to predict consumer behavior under a legal prostitution regime; it also helps isolate
the effects that prostitution laws have on trafficking prevalence independent of anti-traffick-
ing efforts. One may propose, for instance, that if buyers cannot be arrested for purchasing
sex regardless of whom they are paying to have sex with, then they may be more inclined to
report suspected cases of sex trafficking to the police. While potentially real, investigating the
existence of such a “reporting effect” is beyond the scope of this Article. In addition, it is not
necessary that the direction of any potential causal effect that making it legal to purchase sex
with victims of sex trafficking would have on trafficking prevalence is negative. It is possible
that such a legal reform would increase trafficking prevalence by making it possible for sinis-
ter customers who prefer trafficking victims to seek the latter out if the risk of criminal
sanctions is eliminated, which could drive up the price for sex with trafficking victims and
thereby increase the supply of victims in the market.
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are actively, but imperfectly, enforcing both prostitution and traf-
ficking laws;70 and that the resources devoted to combating
prostitution and trafficking are independent, so that changing the
resources devoted to combating one will not affect the resources
available for combating the other.
Take as a further given that this market for prostitution is similar
to a competitive market in some respects but different in others.
The market structure will resemble perfect competition in that
“firms” (i.e. traffickers and individuals who sell sex) are price-takers
holding small market shares, in contrast to a monopoly or an oli-
gopoly. The market will resemble perfect competition, but still
differ from it insofar as sellers provide services with some (limited)
variation in type and quality, and insofar as there is a relatively high
freedom of entry and exit (except for the clear barrier to entry
stemming from the fact that prostitution, at least initially, is illegal).
The market structure will starkly differ from a situation of perfect
competition when it comes to buyers’ levels of information. Instead
of the complete information possessed by buyers in a perfectly com-
petitive market, presume that buyers here have limited information
about the service being provided.71 Assume further, for the sake of
simplicity, that each seller, whether voluntary or trafficked, always
supplies the same quantity of sexual services. Importantly, this im-
plies that any change in supply will affect only the extensive margin,
not the intensive margin.72 To simplify the analysis, also assume that
the practical aspects of the operations carried out by traffickers do
not benefit from a regime in which it is legal to sell sex,73 and that
70. The assumption about enforcement of the laws is critical because it implies that
prostitution and sex trafficking are both de jure and de facto illegal. In reality, clearly, the case
could be very different, because the laws on the books may not actually be actively enforced,
which is one of the primary reasons as to why it is so difficult to study the impact of prostitu-
tion laws; quantifying the degree of enforcement of laws is, if at all possible, extremely
difficult.
71. From this, the important implication follows that buyers may not be perfectly aware
before and during a transaction whether they are paying for sex with a victim of sex traffick-
ing. This assumption seems reasonable based on existing research. See, e.g., Scott R. Peppet,
Prostitution 3.0?, 98 IOWA L. REV. 2031, 2031 (2013) (“The client does not know her history in
any way—whether she has been abused in the past, for example, or suffers from mental or
emotional instability or from drug addiction. Most important, the client has no idea whether
the prostitute may be a victim of sex trafficking. In short, the client is hiring an unknown.”).
72. The extensive margin in this case refers to the number of individuals who are selling
sex whereas the intensive margin refers to the average quantity of sex sold per individual. So,
the rationale for keeping the intensive margin fixed is that the focus of the analysis is the
prevalence of sex trafficking as measured by the number of exploited individuals—not the
incidence of sex trafficking, e.g. the number of exploitative transactions of sexual services
(which is interesting, but even harder to measure).
73. In other words, in this market it neither becomes easier nor cheaper to traffic indi-
viduals for sexual exploitation simply because it is legal to sell sex (whether this is true or not
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the reservation price74 of voluntary sellers equals the reservation
price of traffickers.75
As with markets for other illegal products and services, such as
the current market for illegal drugs or the alcohol market during
Prohibition, banning prostitution will be assumed to not eliminate
the market. So long as demand exists,76 barriers to entry are com-
paratively low, and the price that buyers are willing to pay at least
equals the marginal cost, some individuals will supply the market—
whether they are voluntary sellers or traffickers supplying other
human beings. The equilibrium quantity of both sexual services
and prostitutes will thus depend on a function of demand and sup-
ply, as basic economic theory predicts.
In this hypothetical market for purchased sex, making it legal
both to sell and buy sex should increase the prevalence of prostitu-
tion.77 On both the demand and the supply side, some of those who
is an empirical question—and one worth pursuing in future research). However, in the
model, as we shall see, traffickers may still benefit from legalized prostitution insofar as it
affects the demand for purchased sex.
74. On the supply side, the reservation price refers to the lowest price at which a seller is
willing to sell a good or service.
75. If the reservation price of voluntary sellers were to, in fact, be higher than the reser-
vation price of traffickers, reducing the demand for purchased sex could eventually lead to a
scenario where the whole market for prostitution is supplied by traffickers, since all voluntary
sellers might be priced out of the market. By contrast, if the reservation price of voluntary
sellers is lower than the reservation price of traffickers, then targeting the demand for prosti-
tution would make perfect sense from an anti-trafficking perspective since a sufficiently low
level of demand would cause the market to be completely supplied by voluntary sellers. For a
longer discussion on the economics of prostitution, see generally Robert Skidelsky, The Econo-
mist’s Concubine, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Mar. 22, 2016), https://www.project-syndicate.org/
commentary/economics-of-prostitution-by-robert-skidelsky-2016-03.
76. There are many determinants of the demand for paid sex, but one of the most
important factors is probably a discrepancy between supply and demand in the parallel “mar-
ket” of non-commercialized sex. If there is an undersupply of non-commercialized sex, due,
for example, to skewed ratios of men to women, there will likely be greater demand for paid
sex. See, e.g., Lena Edlund & Evelyn Korn, A Theory of Prostitution, 110 J. POL. ECON. 181, 205
(2002) (arguing that “a surplus of males may be an important determinant of prostitution.
For instance, prostitution was common in the American frontier towns and mining camps,
where men outnumbered women massively”); Nishith Prakash et al., Girls for Sale? Child Sex
Ratio and Girls Trafficking in India, IZA DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 8293, June 2014, at 21–22,
http://www.iza.org/en/webcontent/publications/papers/viewAbstract?dp_id=8293.
77. There are important differences between legalization and decriminalization. See
Weitzer, supra note 11, at 21–22 (“Full decriminalization would remove all criminal penalties
and leave prostitution unregulated, albeit subject to conventional norms against nuisances,
sex in public, or disorderly conduct. Under full decriminalization, street prostitution could
exist on any street, so long as the workers and customers did not disturb the peace or violate
other ordinances. Partial decriminalization would reduce but not eliminate penalties—the
penalty might be a fine instead of incarceration or the charge may be reduced from a felony
to a misdemeanor or violation. A third possibility is de facto decriminalization, which simply
means that the existing law is not enforced, yet the offense remains in the penal code. . . .
Unlike decriminalization, legalization implies regulation of some kind: vetting and licensing
business owners, registering workers, zoning street prostitution, mandatory medical exams,
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were previously discouraged from participating in the market be-
cause of the risk of legal sanctions will now enter the market,
increasing both demand and supply of commercial sexual services.
The equilibrium quantity of sexual services and of individuals who
sell sex will be higher than when it was illegal to sell and buy sex.
With respect to sex trafficking, however, it is not possible to deter-
mine, based on the assumptions made thus far, whether it will
increase or decrease as a result of making prostitution legal. This
uncertainty is in line with the existing literature (both theoretical
and empirical), which, as previously mentioned, provides evidence
in both directions. To answer that question for this hypothetical
market, further assumptions are necessary.
One approach would be to assume that the proportion of people
selling sex who are victims of trafficking remains constant over
time.78 Making prostitution legal in this hypothetical market will, as
stated, increase demand for purchased sex and create economic
profits for suppliers already active in the market. Both the increase
in demand and the removal of criminal sanctions for sellers of sex
will lead new sellers to enter the market. If assumed that the share
of sellers who are trafficking victims will remain constant, then an
increase in supply will lead to an increase in the total number of sex
trafficking victims, i.e. an increase in the prevalence of sex traffick-
ing. Indeed, some previous studies have argued that there will be
such a “scale effect.”79
Yet, it seems highly implausible to assume that the proportion of
trafficking victims will simply remain constant when prostitution
special business taxes, or officials’ periodic site visits and inspections of legal establishments.
A segment of the American public favors legalization, but only in Nevada do legal brothels
exist, since 1971. The 30 brothels are relegated to rural areas of the state and are prohibited
in Las Vegas and Reno due largely to opposition from the gaming industry.” (citations
omitted)).
However, for the purpose of this Article no distinction is drawn between legalization and
decriminalization, in order to focus the theoretical framework and quantitative analysis more
narrowly on whether prostitution is legal or not. Distinguishing between the two and investi-
gating whether decriminalization and legalization, respectively, have different effects on the
prevalence of sex trafficking is a compelling topic for future research.
78. The implication is that if, for instance, one-tenth of all sellers of sexual services are
trafficking victims, the share (in percent) remains constant regardless of the size of the mar-
ket for prostitution. A smaller market for prostitution therefore implies lower levels of sex
trafficking, since the absolute number of victims will be smaller.
79. See Cho et al., supra note 2, at 69. By scale effect, this Article specifically refers to an
increase in the size of the market for prostitution that is also associated with some increase in
the number of people who are victims of sex trafficking. If the market grows without causing
a greater number of individuals to be trafficked, this would not be considered a scale effect,
because effect in this Article generally means effect on sex trafficking specifically. Any changes
in the size of the market for prostitution that do not affect the prevalence of sex trafficking
will therefore not be deemed scale effects.
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laws change, for at least three reasons. First, some customers will
buy sex only when it is legal, because they find that facing criminal
charges is not a risk worth taking. One may presume that at least
some of these buyers are more risk-averse in general than those
who will buy sex regardless of whether prostitution is legal. If that is
true, then those customers who will buy only when prostitution is
legal may, on average, differ from other buyers in other important
respects as well.80 If the predominant reason why they do not par-
ticipate in the market if buying sex is illegal is indeed risk aversion,
then it seems reasonable that they also would want to avoid being
arrested for buying sex with trafficking victims, which in this mar-
ket, as previously stated, is assumed to still be illegal even if
prostitution is made permissible.81 Thus, if the buyers who would
enter the market if prostitution is made legal have a stronger pref-
erence for avoiding the risk of criminal charges, permitting
prostitution will lead to a lower proportion of trafficking victims in
the market for prostitution, as new buyers to a greater extent than
old buyers demand sex provided only by individuals who do so vol-
untarily.82 If everything else is held constant, particularly with
respect to the behavior of the economic agents who participate in
the market even when prostitution is illegal, then the absolute num-
ber of sex trafficking victims will remain the same rather than
increase following a reform of prostitution laws that makes it legal
to buy and sell sex. In other words, there is no change in sex traf-
ficking prevalence.
Importantly, this result clearly would depend on two key assump-
tions: that the new sex buyers who enter the market if prostitution
is made legal both are able to and in practice are going to differen-
tiate between trafficking victims and those who sell sex out of free
will.83 As previously mentioned, however, we assume that the con-
sumers in the hypothetical market under consideration do not have
complete information, which means in particular that their ability
80. The hypothesis that buyers have different reasons for purchasing sex is supported by
empirical research. See, e.g., Weitzer, supra note 41, at 452 (“Customers vary in their back-
ground characteristics, motivation, and behavior, and they buy sex for different reasons.”).
81. The assumption made here is obviously that making prostitution legal does not lead
the government to permit trafficking, which is a realistic assumption based on the de facto
legalization laws that have been implemented in countries such as the Netherlands and Ger-
many, where trafficking still is considered a heinous crime.
82. However, in this scenario, the absolute number of trafficking victims would still re-
main the same, everything else held constant; the difference would be that the fraction of
individuals who are selling sex because they are coerced or deceived will be smaller after
legalization or decriminalization than prior to it because the total market for prostitution will
be bigger.
83. This is an assumption that can be made in theory, but whether it is actually observed
in reality is a different matter, and an important empirical question.
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to differentiate between victims and non-victims is limited. In other
words, buyers may be unaware that they are paying to have sex with
trafficking victims, and therefore may end up doing so even if they
are risk-averse and would strongly prefer to purchase sex from a
voluntary seller. The extent to which this may be true will be dis-
cussed later on in this subpart.
A second reason why the proportion of trafficking victims may
fall if prostitution is made legal is that the buyers who are already
participating in the market and are currently purchasing sex with
victims of trafficking may switch to purchasing sex with non-traf-
ficked sellers to avoid criminal sanctions.84 This shift in consumer
preferences will lead to a temporary increase in the price for sex
with individuals who are selling voluntarily, which will lead some
new voluntary sellers to enter the market. There will also be a tem-
porary decrease in the price for sex with trafficking victims. The
price changes lead to a substitution effect that crowds out some traf-
ficking victims from the market, thereby reducing the prevalence of
sex trafficking. As alluded to in the previous subpart, this form of
substitution effect differs from the kind of substitution effect that
other studies employ.85
Whether there will be such a substitution effect, driven by a
change in consumer preferences, depends on the two key assump-
tions just mentioned: that current sex buyers will be both able to
and willing to differentiate between trafficking victims and volun-
tary sellers. Only then may the voluntary/involuntary make-up of
the supply change. And, again, because (it is assumed) consumers
84. Buyers who pay to have sex with victims of sex trafficking arguably seem to not care
much that they are having sex with trafficking victims since it is illegal and they still do it.
Since it is assumed that there is some variation in type and quality of sexual services provided
and that buyers do not have complete information, they may have a preference for sex with
trafficking victims, or they may not be aware that the person that they are having sex with is a
victim. However, if paying for consensual sex becomes legal, it is possible that they care
enough about avoiding criminal sanctions (although this seemingly is not very important to
them) to start purchasing sex from voluntary sellers rather than with involuntary sellers.
Although beyond the scope of this basic model, this form of substitution is probably real-
istic insofar as making prostitution legal may shift limited law enforcement resources from
enforcing a ban on prostitution to root out sex trafficking specifically. If the police are using
limited resources to enforce laws against prostitution by arresting sellers and buyers, an indi-
vidual buyer’s risk of being arrested will be significantly lower than the risk of arrest for an
individual customer who pays to have sex with trafficking victims if those same resources were
shifted to be dedicated to arrest only buyers who pay to have sex with trafficking victims. This
is because the latter population is much smaller—although its members may be harder to
catch.
85. See supra note 65. What some other papers term substitution effect generally resembles
what this Article dubs a replacement effect.
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lack complete information, they may not be able to identify traffick-
ing victims, which may limit the magnitude of the substitution
effect.86
A third reason why the proportion of trafficking victims may
change if prostitution is made legal is that there may be a form of
replacement effect that is driven by “firm” (i.e. seller) behavior. If
prostitution is made legal, in other words, potential sellers who did
not participate in the market (when selling sex was illegal) may now
enter the market.87 Potentially, these new sellers could replace ex-
isting sellers in the market, including victims of trafficking, by
better reaching customers or by offering preferred services—a pos-
sibility allowed by our assumption that there is some variation in
type and quality of sexual services available.88 This replacement ef-
fect would have an impact on sex trafficking prevalence very similar
to the substitution effect: crowding out trafficking victims from the
market and thereby reducing the prevalence of sex trafficking. The
difference, of course, is that the substitution effect applies to buyers
who are already active in the market (based on a shift in consumer
preferences following prostitution law reforms), whereas the re-
placement effect captures the response by new sellers who enter the
market (caused by firm behavior in the wake of legal reforms). In
other words, the substitution effect starts on the demand side,
whereas the replacement effect starts on the supply side, although
both lead to a similar result of voluntary sellers crowding out traf-
ficking victims from the market for prostitution.
86. Another factor, beyond the scope of this Article, that may limit the magnitude of the
substitution effect is the design of the laws that prohibit buying sex with trafficking victims,
and more specifically the weight put by the legal system on criminal intent. If such a law
requires that a person knowingly purchases sex with a trafficking victim, the average effort
made by risk-averse buyers to avoid having sex with trafficking victims will likely be less than if
a strict liability standard is applied.
87. The entry of new sellers into the market makes sense if a primary barrier to entry is
the prohibition of prostitution, which in this scenario has been removed. Some of the new
sellers will enter as a response to increased demand (and the prospects of, at least temporary,
economic profits), while other sellers will enter simply as a response to the removal of a
major barrier to entry.
88. Although it is beyond the scope of this Article, it should still be noted that in a real-
life situation, if brothel-owning and pimping are permitted, managers and pimps may well
make efforts to avoid selling trafficking victims since they, like buyers, would presumably
prefer to avoid criminal sanctions and could legally facilitate commercial-sex transactions as
long as they are consensual. There could therefore be incentives under a legal regime to
increase the share of supply that comprises non-trafficked sellers, which would likely further
crowd out trafficking victims from the market, thereby contributing to a reduction in the
prevalence of sex trafficking.
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B. A Simple Theoretical Framework for Analyzing the Scale, Substitution,
and Replacement Effects of Prostitution Legislation
There may be some truth to each of the four possible outcomes
of prostitution law reform previously outlined. Yet, further assump-
tions must be made in order to differentiate between them. This
Article, makes the following four. First: Even if the proportion of
trafficking victims among all individuals who sell sex does change,
making prostitution legal could still have a scale effect on sex traf-
ficking. A decrease in the share of trafficking victims and an
increase in the absolute number of trafficking victims are not mutu-
ally exclusive scenarios. Second: Potential buyers who enter the
market after prostitution is permitted, though perhaps more risk-
averse, may still end up purchasing sex from trafficking victims be-
cause they lack complete information. Third: Making prostitution
legal would lead to a substitution effect; some consumers already
active in the market would change their preferences and demand
sex from voluntary sellers. This effect will directly counteract the
scale effect (since the substitution effect reduces trafficking), al-
though the relative magnitude of each effect is unclear. Fourth: If
prostitution is made legal, then the substitution effect will be com-
plemented by a replacement effect that works in the same
direction, as potential sellers who sell sex voluntarily will enter the
market once the risk of incurring punishment for selling sex is
gone. The replacement effect (also of an unknown magnitude) will
similarly reduce the prevalence of sex trafficking by crowding out
trafficking victims from the market.
Based on the very simple framework developed thus far, we can
conclude that making legal only the act of buying sex would lead to
a scale effect that increases sex trafficking (since some of the new
buyers will purchase sex from trafficking victims) and a substitution
effect that reduces sex trafficking (since some of the consumers
who already pay for sex with trafficking victims will substitute for
paid sex with non-victims). By contrast, making legal only the act of
selling sex leads to a replacement effect that reduces sex trafficking
(since some of the new voluntary sellers will crowd out trafficking
victims from the market), but no scale effect associated with in-
creased trafficking.89
89. Even though the removal of a major barrier to entry may increase competition and
lead to better services being offered, which in turn could attract more consumers to enter the
market, this should not increase trafficking. These new consumers would respond to the
availability of new sellers, and the new sellers are assumed to be voluntary sellers. The con-
sumers that enter the market would thus purchase sex only from non-victims. This would
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One final assumption, regarding the relative magnitude of the
effects, clears the way. This Article will take it as a given that, for any
possible reforms of prostitution laws, the magnitude of the scale
effect on the prevalence of sex trafficking dominates the magnitude
of the substitution effect and replacement effect combined.90 Since
both the substitution effect and the replacement effect reduce the
prevalence of sex trafficking (that is, their mathematical signs point
in the same direction), it also follows that that the substitution ef-
fect on trafficking prevalence that is driven by changing consumer
preferences is smaller than the scale effect that follows changes in
aggregate demand.91 In other words, on the demand side, scale is
more important than substitution in determining the prevalence of
sex trafficking.
This rudimentary framework allows us to formulate and, to some
extent in the empirical parts of the Article, test hypotheses about
the potential impact of prostitution law reforms on sex trafficking.
This Article will classify prostitution legislation based on a combina-
tion of two binary characteristics: whether, under the legislation, it
is legal or illegal to sell sex; and whether, under the legislation, it is
therefore be an example of when the size of the market for prostitution grows without affect-
ing trafficking prevalence. See supra note 79.
90. While there are good reasons to think that this assumption may not hold, there are
also compelling reasons for thinking that it may be a realistic one. As discussed in supra note
86, the substitution effect may be very limited. And if the assumption made in this Article that
the variation in sexual services offered by sellers is relatively small, then the ability of new
voluntary sellers to crowd out trafficking victims through replacement would be expected to
similarly be quite limited.
There are reasons why this assumption may turn out to be true. For instance, regarding
the replacement effect specifically, the act of selling sex might be more stigmatized than
buying sex. Few individuals appear to grow up wanting to sell sex, and even among sex buy-
ers, the proportion of individuals who want their children to enter prostitution is very small.
If the stigma associated with selling sex remains high compared with buying sex regardless of
prostitution law reforms, it seems reasonable to believe that the number of new voluntary
sellers that are willing to enter the market is small compared with the number of new buyers
that are willing to enter the market if prostitution is made legal. One could therefore hypoth-
esize that when selling sex is legal, the replacement with respect to trafficking prevalence may
be limited in magnitude compared with the scale effect that is produced by permitting buy-
ing sex. Some empirical evidence suggests as much. See, e.g., Cho et al., supra note 2, at 75–76;
DI NICOLA ET AL., supra note 66, at 132; Jakobsson & Kotsadam, supra note 6, at 16–17.
91. One may question whether it is reasonable to assume that the substitution driven by
changes in consumer preferences in favor of consensual commercial sex is of such limited
scope. However, it is important to note that such a substitution will only occur if buyers who
are currently paying for sex with trafficking victims change their behavior when prostitution
laws are reformed. This implies that there must be customers who under criminalization of
prostitution do not mind paying for sex with trafficking victims, but when it is legal a) no
longer want to do so and b) have sufficient access to information to be able to differentiate
between victims and non-victims. It therefore seems reasonable to assume that the number of
individuals who meet both conditions a and b will be relatively small.
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legal or illegal to buy sex.92 The predicted impact of the scale, sub-
stitution, and replacement effects on sex trafficking for each of the
four possible aspects of prostitution laws is shown in Table 1. By Dtc,
we denote the scale effect, where Dt represents a change in traffick-
ing prevalence and Dtc specifically represents a change in
trafficking prevalence caused by the scale effect. Similarly, by Dtu,
we denote the substitution effect, and by Dtr the replacement effect.
As the table shows, we assume that there is no scale effect on traf-
ficking caused by changes to prostitution laws aimed only at sellers.
Each coefficient represents the expected causal impact of a given
effect on the total number of sex-trafficking victims. So, for exam-
ple, making it legal to buy sex in a jurisdiction where it is currently
illegal will cause two opposing effects: an increase in trafficking
prevalence, due to the scale effect, and a decrease in trafficking
prevalence, due to the substitution effect. However, because this Ar-
ticle assumes that the scale effect will outweigh the substitution
effect, it follows that |Dtc| > | −Dtu|. All else equal, then, the net effect
of making it permissible to buy sex will therefore be an increase in
the prevalence of sex trafficking. By contrast, making it illegal to
buy sex in a jurisdiction where it is presently legal will, all else
equal, produce a decrease in trafficking, due to a negative scale
effect.
TABLE 1: THE PREDICTED IMPACT OF SCALE, SUBSTITUTION, AND
REPLACEMENT EFFECTS ON SEX TRAFFICKING, BY
LEGISLATION COMPONENT
Illegal to Legal to Illegal to Legal to
sell sex sell sex buy sex buy sex
Scale effect * * * * * * Dtc Dtc
Substitution effect * * * * * * Dtu Dtu
Replacement effect Dtr −Dtr * * * * * *
Dtc denotes the scale effect, Dtu the substitution effect, and Dtr the replacement effect. The
signs reflect the expected impact on the prevalence of sex trafficking; thus the substitution
and replacement effects have negative signs, as they reduce the prevalence of sex trafficking.
Changes in prostitution laws with respect to sellers lead to the
following net results: making it illegal to sell sex should increase sex
trafficking, while permitting the sale of sex should decrease it. For
instance, if selling sex is criminalized in a market where selling cur-
rently is legal, then some of those who are selling sex freely would
be expected to leave the market whereas those who are operating in
92. As discussed below, this produces four distinct sets of prostitution laws; as it turns
out, all four been implemented in various European jurisdictions. See infra Part III.B.
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the market because of coercion, fraud, or force would not. The exit
of sellers from the market is likely to result in an undersupply of
commercial sexual services—a void that may be filled by additional
trafficking victims, thereby leading to a negative substitution effect
that has a positive effect93 on trafficking.
Using the assumption that the scale effect is greater than the sum
of the substitution and replacement effects, we can simplify the re-
sults in Table 1 in the following way. This assumption, that |−Dtc| >
(|Dtu| + |−Dtr|), implies that (|−Dtc| − |Dtu|) > | − Dtr|, which means
that making it illegal to buy sex will reduce sex-trafficking preva-
lence to a greater extent than making it legal to sell sex, in
accordance with Table 2. Naturally, this also implies that making it
legal to buy sex will produce a larger increase in the prevalence of
trafficking than will making it illegal to sell sex, as that table also
indicates.
TABLE 2: THE PREDICTED RELATIVE IMPACT OF SCALE, SUBSTITUTION,
AND REPLACEMENT EFFECTS ON SEX TRAFFICKING, BY
LEGISLATION COMPONENT
Illegal to Legal to Illegal to Legal to
sell sex sell sex buy sex buy sex
Net impact of
scale, substitution, Smaller Smaller Larger Larger
and replacement increase decrease decrease increase
effects combined
Based on the theoretical results displayed in Table 2, the four
possible types of prostitution laws94 have net effects on sex traffick-
ing with two different signs and of four different magnitudes. This
is clear from combining a prostitution regime for sellers with a re-
gime for buyers and then putting together the effects of the two
regimes. Making it illegal to buy sex should reduce the prevalence
of sex trafficking, but the magnitude of the net effect depends on
whether selling sex is illegal or legal. Similarly, making legal the act
of purchasing sex is expected to overall increase sex trafficking, but
the net effect again depends on whether selling sex is legal or ille-
gal. The following subpart explores the four different types of
prostitution laws, as well as their predicted net effects on sex traf-
ficking, in greater depth.
93. Positive here means an increase, not a desirable outcome.
94. Again, these are: 1) illegal to sell but legal to buy; 2) legal to sell and legal to buy; 3)
illegal to sell and illegal to buy; and 4) legal to sell but illegal to buy.
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C. Beyond the Binary Model: Four Types of Prostitution Laws
As mentioned earlier, one study found that the scale effect domi-
nates the substitution effect,95 which suggests that legalizing or
decriminalizing prostitution is associated with increases in traffick-
ing. The theoretical framework presented in this Article is
consistent with that study’s empirical results, as we assume that the
scale effect dominates the substitution and replacement effects
combined. At the same time, though, that particular study, and
many others, have used an insufficiently discriminating, binary clas-
sification of prostitution laws. Thus, it is unclear to what extent such
studies’ conclusions will hold true once prostitution laws are
grouped into four basic types, instead of two.
Implicitly or explicitly, most existing studies quantify prostitution
laws as a binary variable, where 1 signifies that prostitution is legal,
and 0 that prostitution is illegal (or vice versa).96 But, as the previ-
ous subpart argued, this is simply too crude a measure; in both
theory and practice, there are at the very least four types of prostitu-
tion laws. Accordingly, this Article divides prostitution laws into the
four categories already mentioned: 1) illegal to sell sex, but legal to
buy sex; 2) legal to sell sex and to buy sex; 3) illegal to sell sex and
to buy sex; and 4) legal to sell sex, but illegal to buy sex.97
In their study, Cho and her coauthors make the important con-
tribution of distinguishing between the scale effect and (their
version of) a substitution effect, and hypothesizing that these two
effects have opposing influences on sex trafficking.98 Generally,
their paper highlights the complexity of the relationship between
prostitution laws and sex trafficking underscoring that it is not obvi-
ous what prostitution policy is optimal for combating trafficking, let
alone for maximizing other desirable outcomes.
95. Recall, though, that the cited study uses a version of the substitution effect that dif-
fers from the one employed in this Article. See supra note 65.
96. See, e.g., Cho et al. supra note 2, at 81 (“Dummy indicating whether or not a country
allows prostitution. 1 being legal and 0 otherwise.”); Akee et al., supra note 62, at 20 (“. . . we
include whether host and source countries have laws banning prostitution . . .”). There are,
however, some notable exceptions, including Jakobsson & Kotsadam, supra note 6, at 23 (us-
ing a three-point variable rather than a binary variable: “Categorical variable where 1 implies
it is illegal to buy and/or sell sex; 2 that prostitution is legal but procuring is illegal; and 3
that prostitution and procuring is legal.”).
97. While it is beyond the scope of the Article, it should be noted that there are many
more ways, of categorizing prostitution laws. The framework developed in this Article ana-
lyzes only two dimensions of prostitution: buying and selling, simply defined. But there are
others, including brothel-owning and pimping, and whether prostitution is legalized or
decriminalized, which would produce many more categories of prostitution laws that even
better reflect the action policies implemented in different jurisdictions.
98. Cho et al., supra note 2, at 68.
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But, without diminishing the value of their contributions, their
work does only capture a limited dimension of prostitution laws.
The authors’ methodological approach is too blunt, in that it as-
sumes that prostitution can be only legal or illegal, and hence that
prostitution laws are to be coded as a binary variable.99
As already noted, however, the reality on the ground cannot be
well captured by a binary variable. While some European countries
(such as Montenegro,100 Serbia,101 and, prior to its reform,
Romania102) criminalize103 selling but not buying sex, others (such
as Sweden,104 Norway,105 and Iceland106) criminalize purchasing but
not selling sex. If only a binary variable is used, it is unclear how the
prostitution laws of these six countries should be rated. For any of
them, is prostitution legal or illegal? Using four, rather than two,
categories of prostitution laws help to better capture some of the
real variation in policies toward the market for paid sex.
So, what are the effects of each of the four categories of prostitu-
tion laws on sex trafficking? If a country where both selling and
buying sex are legal (such as the Netherlands107), were to make
both practices illegal, this theoretical framework predicts an in-
crease in sex trafficking, due to negative substitution (as some
existing buyers may change their preferences from non-trafficked
sellers to trafficking victims) and negative replacement (as certain
non-trafficked sellers exit the market and are replaced by traffick-
ing victims), but overall a stronger decrease in sex trafficking due to
a negative scale effect (as existing buyers leave the market the size
of the market for prostitution shrinks, putting traffickers out of bus-
iness).108 However, if the country in question makes only buying sex
99. See supra note 95.
100. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, H.R. AND LAB., 2009 HUMAN RIGHTS
REPORT: MONTENEGRO (2010), http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/eur/136048.htm
(“Prostitution and offering sexual services are crimes, but using the services of a prostituted
person is not a criminal offense.”).
101. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, H.R. AND LAB., 2008 HUMAN RIGHTS
REPORT: SERBIA (2009), http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/eur/119103.htm (“Pros-
titution is illegal, although being a client of a prostitute is not a criminal offense.”).
102. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, H.R. AND LAB., supra note 100.
103. This reflects the state of the countries’ prostitution laws between 2008 and 2010, the
time period covered by the EU data used in this Article. Since then, some laws have changed.
In 2014, for example, Romania decriminalized the sale of sex. See Madeline Fetterly et al.,
Presentation Abstract, Romania: Policy Approach to Prostitution and Protection of Vulnera-
ble Women and Girls from Sexual Exploitation (2015), https://perma.cc/8MUZ-T7UU.
104. See, e.g., McClelland, supra note 23.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See generally DAALDER, supra note 15.
108. Note that non-trafficked sellers will also be put out of business as buyers exit the
market, which is why a comprehensive approach to prostitution laws must consider effects
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illegal, while continuing to permit the selling of sex,109 the frame-
work predicts an even greater net decrease in sex trafficking, as
there will be not only a negative scale effect (albeit one inevitably
offset to some extent by a negative substitution effect), but also no
negative replacement effect (since no voluntary sellers would not
be expected to leave the market and thereafter be replaced by traf-
ficking victims).
In sum, even the very basic framework adopted by this Article
makes clear that prostitution laws like those of the United States
may have quite different effects on rates of sex trafficking from laws
like those of Sweden. And yet many existing studies, because they
have coded prostitution laws as binary, have been forced either to
omit “mixed” prostitution law jurisdictions like Sweden or to lump
them in with either the United States, on the one hand, or Ger-
many, on the other. Thus, a number of countries—Serbia,
Montenegro, Romania (prior to its reform), Iceland, Norway, and
Sweden, for instance—would have to be either omitted from the
analysis or else lumped together with countries that take signifi-
cantly different approaches to prostitution. Clearly, neither of those
options is analytically ideal. This Article, by contrast, by developing
a new variable that quantifies four types of prostitution regimes, can
capture more variation than approaches based on a legal/illegal bi-
nary variable.110
If the theory this Article proposes is correct, one would expect to
see the most trafficking in countries where it is illegal to sell but
legal to buy sex, and to see the lowest trafficking in countries where
it is legal to sell but illegal to buy sex. The full results of what this
Article’s theoretical framework predicts111 regarding the four types
of prostitution laws and sex trafficking prevalence are shown in Ta-
ble 3.
beyond sex trafficking. There may be significant costs associated with combating trafficking,
including depriving voluntary sellers of their livelihood; this includes voluntary sellers who
are forced to exit the market due not only to substantial reductions in demand but also to
significant reductions in income following falling price levels for sellers who remain active in
the market.
109. This is also Canada’s approach. See McClelland, supra note 23.
110. As previously noted, it would be possible to create a measurement scale with more
than four points to capture an even greater variation in prostitution laws. But using a four-
point scale both avoids making the analysis too complex and also, as Part V reveals, might be
enough to yield some fruitful results. Furthermore, it serves as a good initial step. Still,
searching for further principles of differentiation, in an attempt to capture even greater vari-
ance in prostitution laws, would certainly be a worthwhile area for future research.
111. These predictions are just that: predictions. They depend on the assumptions dis-
cussed above, some of which may strike the reader as implausible, and others which are very
difficult to verify empirically. If any of the assumptions prove incorrect, these predictions
would likely change, perhaps drastically.
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TABLE 3: THE PREDICTED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE FOUR TYPES
OF PROSTITUTION LAWS AND THE PREVALENCE OF SEX TRAFFICKING,
AND BETWEEN THE FOUR TYPES OF PROSTITUTION LAWS AND THE
SIGNS OF THE SCALE, SUBSTITUTION, AND REPLACEMENT EFFECTS
Criminalize Criminalize Criminalize Criminalize
sellers only neither both buyers only
Predicted
prevalence of sex Highest Higher Lower Lowest
trafficking
Predicted scale
Positive Positive Negative Negative
effect
Predicted
Positive Positive Negative Negative
substitution effect
Predicted
Negative Positive Negative Positive
replacement effect
Recall that the scale effect has a positive impact on sex trafficking whereas the substitution
effect and replacement effect have a negative impact. This means that, for instance, a nega-
tive substitution effect (under regimes that criminalize buyers only or that criminalize both
sellers and buyers) increases sex trafficking whereas a negative scale effect decreases
trafficking.
Using the summarized results in Table 3, this Article now pro-
ceeds to develop a new and very simple measure of prostitution
laws, which it dubs the Prostitution Law Index (PLI, or Index). The
Index is based on the extent to which each of the four types of
prostitution laws is expected to reduce or increase sex trafficking.
For reasons discussed in greater detail in the next Part, the PLI
codes jurisdictions according to their laws as follows: criminalizing
sellers only is a 1; criminalizing neither sellers nor buyers is a 2;
criminalizing both sellers and buyers is a 3; and criminalizing buy-
ers only is as 4. In light of the discussion thus far, that means that
higher score indicates a greater expected prevalence in sex
trafficking.
D. The Demand Model
Sweden pioneered efforts to combat prostitution by reducing the
demand for purchased sex.112 In 1999, the country implemented
the Demand Model—that is, it passed laws that targeted sex buyers
by making it illegal to buy sex, but still allowing people to sell sex.113
112. See, e.g., Rubin, supra note 17, at 2 (“A few countries, now including France, penalize
customers. Sweden was a pioneer, enacting such a law in 1999.”).
113. See Waltman, supra note 31, at 135.
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Before the law came into effect, pimping was illegal, but prostitu-
tion was permitted.114 The new law therefore effectively
criminalized the act of buying sex, while leaving sellers free to con-
tinue selling sex.
One might wonder if there is really any meaningful difference
between the Swedish law and a law banning prostitution altogether.
After all, if it is illegal to purchase sex, would that not have the
same, or at least very similar effects as a law that penalizes the act of
selling sex, too? Defenders of the Swedish law might give three rea-
sons why not. First, those who sell sex do not risk being arrested for
selling sex when it is legal to do so.115 This means that those who
are voluntary sellers may keep some trafficking victims out of the
market through absence of a negative replacement effect. Second,
law enforcement resources could be focused on arresting sex buy-
ers instead of sellers, which might drive down the demand for
purchased sex to a greater extent than an overall ban (because of
an increased negative scale effect).116 Third, the prostitution law
might function as a signal that what is normatively undesirable is
not selling sex but purchasing it; such signaling could, at least in
theory, shift the stigma from sellers to buyers and lead to even
greater reductions in the demand for commercial sex.
The Demand Model has gained further traction in recent years.
Following passage in Norway (in 2008) and Iceland (2009), it was
quickly adopted in Northern Ireland, Canada, and France. And in
February 2014, a 343-to-139 majority of the European Parliament
voted to back a resolution urging EU member states to adopt simi-
lar legislation. Of the outcome, Mary Honeywell, the resolution’s
sponsor, said, “Rather than blanket legalization, [the European]
114. Id.
115. It should be noted, however, that sellers may still be arrested for prostitution-related
activities, such as procuring sex. Indeed, this has given rise to repeated criticism of the law,
since it means that sellers may be frequently arrested, even when selling sex is legal. See, e.g.,
Don Kulick, Sex in the New Europe: The Criminalization of Clients and Swedish Fear of Penetration, 3
ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORY 201 (2003) (“It is illegal to profit in any way from sexual services
performed by anyone else. This is positive in the sense that it makes the exploitation of sex
workers and others by unscrupulous profiteers illegal. But it also makes it illegal for sex
workers to rent apartments or commercial spaces for work, it makes it illegal for them to hire
anyone to book their appointments, it makes it illegal to openly advertise their services in
newspapers and magazines, and it even makes it difficult for them to live with anybody, since
their lover, roommate or friend could be seen as profiting from the sex worker’s income, in
cases where they share expenses or have joint bank accounts.”).
116. This argument fits the simple theoretical model considered in this Article; while it
was assumed that resources devoted to combating prostitution and trafficking were indepen-
dent of each other, this assumption would not affect the ability to shift around resources to,
for example, target buyers rather than sellers of sex.
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parliament has backed the more nuanced approach already prac-
ticed in Sweden as a means of tackling prostitution. This punishes
men who treat women’s bodies as a commodity, without criminaliz-
ing women who are driven into sex work.”117
The big question still remains: does the Demand Model have its
intended effect? Its backers have claimed that, in addition to com-
bating prostitution, it may reduce sex trafficking as well. And, in
theory, the approach may sound compelling. But whether the
Model actually works in practice—and in particular, whether it has
the potential to curb sex trafficking—is an empirical question,
which has not been conclusively answered. This Article attempts to
provide (very) tentative results from a quasi-experimental analysis,
which suggest that adoption of the Model may in fact potentially
have helped reduce sex trafficking in Norway.118 Nevertheless, while
this Article finds that certain combinations of prostitution laws
seem to be associated with lower levels of sex trafficking, those com-
binations may or may not be effective at achieving other desirable
outcomes, such as the aforementioned welfare of voluntary sellers
of sex.
III. DATA
A. The Recent EU Data on Sex Trafficking and Human Trafficking
In January 2012, the European Commission (the EU’s executive
arm) mandated the use of standardized data-collection methodolo-
gies, with the goal of producing reliable country-by-country statistics
117. Maya Oppenheim, MEPs Vote to Criminalise Buying Sex, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 26,
2014), http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2014/feb/26/meps-vote-criminal-
ise-buying-sex-european-parliament.
118. It is worth reiterating that, while the focus of this Article is sex trafficking, many
other issues may be equally important to a jurisdiction’s choice of prostitution laws. As previ-
ously mentioned, many advocates of the Demand Model, keen to use prostitution laws to
eliminate prostitution altogether, think that the Model helps further that ambitious goal.
Scholars and policymakers have also pointed to other issues to be taken into account when
drafting prostitution laws, such as violence against sellers, individual autonomy of sellers,
health risks, and opportunities to make a livelihood. This Article intentionally leaves the
bigger normative inquiry aside, but that should in no way be seen as playing down its
importance.
It would be highly worthwhile for future research on prostitution laws to address the
effects that different types of legislation may have on violent crime against sellers, on sexual
assault in general, and on the welfare of those who sell sex voluntarily. And these are only
some of the many considerations that policymakers should take into account when they de-
sign prostitution laws. Sex trafficking, while certainly critical, is but one consideration.
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on sex trafficking and human trafficking across the EU.119 The first
data collected in accordance with that mandate was released in
fairly short order in 2013, and was accompanied by an official re-
port.120 The dataset, which covers the years 2008–2010, provides
estimates of the number of human-trafficking victims in a country
in a given year, albeit with a significant number of missing observa-
tions.121 While its principal source of information on victims is the
police,122 the report also incorporates data provided by NGOs, im-
migration authorities, and border guards. All of the trafficking
numbers in this Article come from this new European Union
dataset.123
The data includes identified victims as well as presumed victims,
for both sex trafficking124 and other types of human trafficking
(such as labor trafficking and trafficking in human organs).125 That
allows this Article to examine not only the link between prostitution
laws and sex trafficking but also the link between prostitution laws
and human trafficking generally. Making good on that possibility,
119. See THE EUROPEAN COMM’N, COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EURO-
PEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL: MEASURING CRIME IN THE EU 4 (2012), http://
ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/doc_centre/crime/docs/1_en_act_part1_v5.pdf#zoom=100
(discussing the need for “collection of comparable and harmonised data at EU level”).
120. EUROSTAT, TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS: 2013 EDITION (2013).
121. Id. at 21, 24 (defining trafficking as “the recruitment, transportation, transfer,
harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of
coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of
vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a
person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation
shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of
sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude
or the removal of organs.” Sexual exploitation “includes exploitation for forced prostitution
or other forms in the areas of street prostitution, window prostitution, private flats, brothels,
strip clubs/bars, pornography production companies, escort services, massage parlours, mod-
elling agencies, hotels, private clubs.”).
122. See EUROSTAT, supra note 120, at 38–40 (listing various forms of data gathered by the
police, including identified victims, investigations against pimps, and reported offenses).
123. For more information about the European Commission’s data, see EUROPEAN
COMM’N, Organised Crime & Human Trafficking: Statistics, MIGRATION AND HOME AFF., http://
.europa.eu///-do//-and-human-trafficking//_en.htm (last updated Feb. 4, 2015).
124. See EUROSTAT, supra note 120, at 22 (defining an identified victim as “a person who
has been formally identified as a victim of trafficking in human beings according to the
relevant formal authority in Member States,” and a presumed victim as “a person who has
met the criteria of EU regulations and international Conventions but has not been formally
identified by the relevant authorities (police) as a trafficking victim or who has declined to be
formally or legally identified as trafficked”).
125. Although sex trafficking is a subset of human trafficking in this dataset, a victim can
be a subject to more than one type of exploitation. With respect to trafficking victims, the
subsets are therefore collectively exhaustive, but not mutually exclusive. Simply adding vic-
tims of sex trafficking, labor trafficking, and other types of human trafficking together will
yield a number greater than the total number of human trafficking victims. The total num-
bers in the study have accounted for all duplicates and thus avoided overcounting.
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the Article includes human trafficking as a second outcome
variable.
Not limiting the analysis to sex trafficking alone is important for
at least two reasons. First, data on sex trafficking is notoriously hard
to collect.126 But to the extent that sex trafficking and human traf-
ficking are correlated, the latter can serve as a proxy for the
former.127 Moreover, for many countries, there are estimates of the
prevalence of human trafficking in general but no numbers on sex
trafficking specifically; indeed, this is the case for some of the coun-
tries included in the EU trafficking dataset used in this Article.128 It
therefore makes sense to run separate analyses of human trafficking
data to increase the sample size, with the goal of making the analy-
sis more reliable. If the relationship between prostitution laws and
the two types of trafficking are both significant, the results are likely
to be more robust.
Second, one might worry about possible harmful spillover effects
from curbing sex trafficking. For instance, if cost-benefit ratios
change so that it becomes more rewarding for traffickers to supply
labor instead of sexual services, one might in certain cases see an
increase in labor trafficking accompanying a decrease in sex traf-
ficking.129 Since sex trafficking is a subset of human trafficking, it is
possible that there would then be merely a change in the relative
prevalence of different forms of human trafficking, rather than an
overall reduction. But, if statistically significant results were to show
that outcomes for sex trafficking and human trafficking tended in
the same direction, one would not have to worry as much about the
risk of negative spillover effects from legislation meant to combat
sex trafficking.
Despite the relative quality of the dataset compared with some
other datasets, several important caveats are, as always when study-
ing trafficking, in order. First, more reported cases of trafficking do
not necessarily mean that the number of victims has increased; in-
creased reports of trafficking may equally well be the result of
improvements in reporting by non-governmental organizations or
of intensified police efforts to identify trafficking victims. The fact
126. See, Frank Laczko & Marco A. Gramegna, Developing Better Indicators of Human Traf-
ficking, 10 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 179, 183 (2003).
127. Although the author has not been able to locate other scholarship making this
claim, it is a tenable position, because sex trafficking constitutes a major subset of all human
trafficking.
128. In other words, the dataset used in this Article provides more complete data with
respect to human trafficking than with respect to sex trafficking. Looking in addition at
human trafficking will therefore increase the statistical power of the analysis.
129. This scenario envisions that sex traffickers would exit the market for prostitution
and enter the market for trafficked labor instead.
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that some countries in the dataset have very low levels of trafficking
may reflect poor data rather than minimal trafficking. Similarly,
high reported levels of trafficking could reflect a prioritization by
the government to try to measure and root out trafficking. How-
ever, as long as the data quality is not statistically related to a
country’s type of prostitution laws, the sign and magnitude of the
coefficients in the regression analyses should not be biased, and
should only make it less likely that the coefficients are statistically
significant. Unfortunately, though, it is very difficult, if not impossi-
ble, to test whether the quality of the data is related to prostitution
laws. It may be, for example, that countries in which both selling
and buying sex are legal make greater efforts than other countries
to report instances of trafficking; that would explain why some
countries that have legalized or decriminalized prostitution see rel-
atively high levels of trafficking prevalence. If so, a correlation
between legal prostitution and higher levels of trafficking would in-
correctly suggest that making prostitution legal may increase
trafficking.
While the dataset thus has its limitations, it represents a promis-
ing, if small, step on the way to resolving perhaps the biggest
preliminary challenge facing current sex-trafficking research: gath-
ering reliable data that will allow comparisons over both time and
space. Because trafficking is an illegal and clandestine activity,
many of its victims are part of a “hidden population” that is excep-
tionally difficult to quantify and study.130 Even the estimates that do
exist131 must be interpreted with great caution.132 Even still, the new
EU dataset goes beyond previous reports; it allows comparisons that
single-country reports133 and other, cruder international surveys134
simply do not.
130. See Guri Tyldum & Anette Brunovskis, Describing the Unobserved: Methodological Chal-
lenges in Empirical Studies on Human Trafficking, in DATA AND RESEARCH ON HUMAN
TRAFFICKING: A GLOBAL SURVEY 17–34 (Frank Laczko & Elzbieta Gozdziak eds., 2005).
131. See, e.g., PATRICK BELSER ET AL., ILO MINIMUM ESTIMATE OF FORCED LABOUR IN THE
WORLD (2005).
132. See, e.g., Weitzer, supra note 11, at 456 (writing about data on both prostitution and
trafficking that, “[g]iven the underground nature of this economy, estimates of both its cur-
rent magnitude and changes over time are highly dubious”).
133. Data on trafficking is often subcategorized into three groups: trafficking routes,
country reports, and victim characteristics. See, e.g., Kristiina Kangaspunta, Mapping the Inhu-
man Trade: Preliminary Findings of the Database of Trafficking in Human Beings, 3 F. ON CRIME AND
SOC’Y 81, 87 (2003). Conducted well, single-country reports can mitigate the issue of compar-
ing data across time; but if the data is not collected in a standardized way across countries,
conducting a robust comparative analysis will remain difficult.
134. One such alternative is the dataset from UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND
CRIME (UNODC), GLOBAL REPORT ON TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS (2009). While covering over
160 countries, the dataset is nonetheless limited by the fact that its dependent variable is
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While some readers might object that restricting the analysis to
European Union data forms a major limitation of this Article, such
a narrow focus still has its advantages. Because data on sex traffick-
ing commonly suffers from a lack of reliability, it may be most
appropriate to restrict analysis of sex trafficking to regions whose
countries are comparatively similar in terms of law, economics,
politics, history, and culture. These and many other similarities per-
vade the EU: its countries share not only a common history, but
also a common present. The Union has its own budget, legislative
body, laws, courts, and other institutions. And it is thanks to one of
those institutions, the EC, that we now have a first attempt at har-
monized data collection on sex trafficking and human trafficking,
which makes more robust quantitative analysis possible.
B. The Prostitution Law Index (PLI)
Building on the theoretical framework developed in the previous
Part,135 this Subpart presents a new quantification of prostitution
laws based on their expected impact on the prevalence of sex traf-
ficking. As mentioned, several previous studies seem to have
quantified only whether prostitution is legal or illegal. In many
cases,136 the main independent variable is a binary variable where 1
implies legal (or criminalized) prostitution and 0 means criminal-
ized (or legal) prostitution. This means that a country like Sweden,
where it is legal to sell sex but not to buy sex, could end up being
coded identically to Croatia, where it is illegal both to buy and to
sell sex. Or that Serbia and Germany are both coded as “0,” despite
the fact that Germans can both buy and sell sex whereas Serbians
may buy but not sell sex.
Because it collapses these and other differences, the analytical
purchase of the binary approach is limited. In particular, it ignores
the fact that, at the very least, four categories are needed to de-
scribe the differences between current European prostitution laws.
In an attempt to capture these differences, this Article proposes
quantifying prostitution laws on a four-point rather than a two-
point scale. This proposed index captures how well different types
of prostitution laws are predicted to reduce the prevalence of sex
ordinal, placed along a six-point scale that measures human trafficking inflows. The new
European Union dataset on trafficking has the advantage of measuring the actual quantity of
trafficking in persons, which allows for greater variation over time. And, as mentioned al-
ready above, it has the benefit of measuring both sex trafficking and human trafficking.
135. See supra Part II.
136. See supra note 96.
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trafficking, based on the assumptions made in the theoretical
model. Since there are four types of prostitution laws in the frame-
work presented in this Article, the index scores prostitution laws
from 1 to 4. Table 4 displays the suggested quantification. The Pros-
titution Law Index (PLI) score for any individual country is based
on the information provided in the United States Department of
State’s annual Human Rights Report for the period 2008–2010.137
TABLE 4: THE PROSTITUTION LAW INDEX (PLI)
Prostitution Law Prostitution law category
Index score
4 Buying sex is illegal, but selling sex is legal
3 Both buying and selling sex are illegal
2 Neither buying nor selling sex is illegal
1 Buying sex is legal, but selling sex is illegal
On the basic theory this Article has proposed, a scale effect
should increase sex trafficking, while a substitution and a replace-
ment effect will reduce trafficking. It is reasonable, therefore, to
assign higher scores to laws that tend to produce a substitution ef-
fect or a replacement effect, and to assign lower scores to laws that
tend to produce a scale effect. Laws that promote replacement but
discourage scale (and, inevitably, also substitution), such as Swe-
den’s and Norway’s, thus receive a score of 4, whereas laws like
Croatia’s, which discourage not only scale but also substitution and
replacement, receive a score of 3. Laws like those in Germany and
the Netherlands, which permit both selling and buying sex and
thereby promote scale, substitution, and replacement, are assigned
a score of 2, while prostitution laws in countries such as Serbia and
Montenegro,138 which penalize only sellers—and thereby discour-
age substitution and replacement while promoting scale—are
scored as a 1. This ordering of national laws is based entirely on the
137. See BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, Human Rights, Reports: Years
2008, 2009, 2010, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrp/index.htm (last
visited Nov. 1, 2016).
138. While many readers will be familiar with the prostitution laws that correspond to
scores 2, 3, and 4, they may never have heard of a case where buying sex is legal, but selling
sex is illegal. To demonstrate what such laws may look like in practice, one can therefore
consider the case of Romania prior to its recent prostitution law reform. In Romania, prosti-
tution was illegal, and the police regularly fined sellers of sex for loitering and disturbing the
peace. At the same time, however, no laws existed to punish clients of prostitution, unless
they knowingly purchased sex with a minor.
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theory laid out in previous subparts, and comports with Tables 1, 2,
and 3.
Because the Prostitution Law Index is an ordinal rather than a
binary variable, the variance in the main independent variable will
be higher than in several of the previous studies on prostitution
laws and trafficking.
At the same time, it is appropriate to emphasize the limits of the
Index. First, it captures only the de jure prostitution laws of a given
country, not the de facto regulatory regime that may arise from selec-
tive enforcement of laws on the books. If a country has criminalized
both buying and selling sex, for example, but in reality punishes
predominantly sellers (which may well be the case in much of the
United States139), then that country’s prostitution laws will be coded
as a 3 in the Index, despite the fact that, if laws were coded based
on actual enforcement, they would have received a 1. The simple
reason for this is the lack of good data on actual enforcement of
prostitution laws across European countries.
Second, while using a four-point scale to capture the variation in
prostitution laws certainly is an improvement compared with previ-
ous studies that only use a binary scale, there is clearly much more
variation in prostitution laws than that encoded in the PLI—for ex-
ample, laws governing pimping and brothel-owning. It would be
interesting to see what results would emerge with fuller account
taken of such variation. It could also be worthwhile for future stud-
ies to factor in both the certainty of punishment and the severity of
punishment with respect to prostitution laws, to see if, for instance,
higher certainty and lower severity of punishment for sex buyers (if
buying is illegal) has a similar impact on the prevalence of sex traf-
ficking as lower certainty and higher severity of punishment.
IV. METHOD
A. Cross-Section Analysis with Time-Fixed Effects
This Article employs two basic regression models: one cross-sec-
tion regression analysis with time-fixed effects, and one based on
Difference-in-Differences estimators. The following two regression
models are used for the cross-section analysis, the only difference
between them being the dependent variable:
139. See supra note 14.




Sextrafficking represents the identified and presumed number of
trafficking victims in country i in year t, while Prostitutionlawindex-
score is the four-point scale variable and the main independent
variable. Democracy comprises a twenty-one-point scale variable that
measures how democratic or authoritarian a country is, Ruleoflaw
quantifies rule of law, Population is the size of the country’s popula-
tion, and Populationdensity captures how densely populated the
country is. Urbanization is the urbanization rate, Immigration mea-
sures immigration flows, Foreigners controls for the stock of foreign-
born citizens, Tourism is the number of tourists per capita, and PPP
measures income per capita based on purchasing power standards.
Unemployment is the annual average unemployment rate, Povertyrisk
is the proportion of people living at the risk of falling below the
poverty threshold, Imports is imports per capita. Year is a set of
dummy variables to capture time-fixed effects.
B. Difference-in-Differences
In 2008, Norway followed Sweden’s example and introduced leg-
islation that penalized purchasing sex without criminalizing selling
sex. The law came into effect in 2009.140 Because the new European
Union dataset runs from 2008 to 2010, it presents an opportunity to
140. See, e.g., Norway’s Closely Watched Prostitution Ban Works, Study Finds, REUTERS (Aug. 11,
2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-norway-prostitution-idUSKBN0GB1BL20140811.
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make some (very) tentative estimates of the potential causal impact
of Norway’s implementation of the Demand Model, and set the
stage for future analyses of prostitution laws based on the same ana-
lytical framework. This article uses a quasi-experimental method,
estimating the potential causal effect by regarding the prostitution
law reform in Norway as an intervention and using similar Nordic
countries as a baseline for comparison. It follows a Difference-in-
Differences approach, an analytical framework commonly used to
estimate the effect of the implementation of a particular law or pol-
icy where it would not be feasible to run an experiment.141
The validity of a Difference-in-Differences analysis depends on
one crucial assumption above all, the parallel-trends assumption.
This particular mode of analysis assumes, counterfactually, that the
observed time trend in the outcome variable for the intervention
group before the policy was introduced would, but for the interven-
tion, have closely tracked that of the comparison group. Here, the
assumption is that, had the country not introduced demand-target-
ing prostitution legislation, Norway would have followed the trends
in trafficking observed over the same time span in three other Nor-
dic countries: Sweden, Denmark, and Finland.
The parallel-trends assumption is shaky for at least two general
reasons. First, the comparison group may not be sufficiently similar
to the intervention group.142 Second, another event may have oc-
curred during the time period in question (here, when the
Demand Model was introduced), and that other intervention may
be responsible, in part or in whole, for any estimated causal effect.
In the present context, one might worry that Sweden, Denmark,
and Finland are not sufficiently similar to Norway with respect to
trends in trafficking prevalence or that some other policy or event
in Norway during the same time period as its prostitution law re-
form materially affected its prevalence of trafficking. Either
situation would likely lead to incorrectly attributing a causal impact
to the reform of prostitution laws.
In theory, the first reason to question the validity of the Differ-
ence-in-Differences model can be partially tested by comparing
time trends in the intervention and comparison countries before
the reform was implemented. Unfortunately, however, because the
new European Union dataset has only one data point from before
141. See, e.g., Gaynor et al., supra note 38.
142. “Similar” here refers to similar time trends in the outcome variable, such as in the
prevalence of sex trafficking and human trafficking. Whether the prevalence levels are simi-
lar does not actually matter at all, because such gaps can easily be taken into account. What
matters is the direction and the pace at which the outcome variable is moving.
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Norway’s reform came into effect, such a test is not feasible here.
Instead, we are thrown back to intuition and other types of evi-
dence. This is true for the second reason as well; indeed, in almost
all Difference-in-Differences analyses, it is notoriously hard, if not
impossible, to develop an empirical test capable of testing and rul-
ing out other possible causes.
In the language of scientific experiment, Norway in this case con-
stitutes the “treatment group,” while the Norwegian prostitution
law reform is the “treatment” (the equivalent of a new drug in a
clinical medical trial), and Sweden, Denmark, and Finland, the
three countries that did not reform their prostitution laws, form the
“control group.” If the parallel-trends assumption holds and the
quality of the data is sufficiently high, then the regression model
should properly estimate the potential causal impact of the Norwe-
gian reform. At that point, there will be at least a (very) tentative
answer to the question of whether targeting demand for purchased
sex (according to the Demand Model) may have reduced the preva-
lence of sex trafficking in Norway.





Estimation equations (3) and (4), while similar to (1) and (2),
differ from them in four ways. First, Norwegianreform is included, to
assign Norway to the intervention group and the other three coun-
tries to the comparison group. Second, Year is recoded as a single
binary variable that marks whether a given year came before Nor-
way’s new prostitution law went into effect, to capture pre- and post-
reform effects. Third, Interaction is an interaction variable; based on
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a multiplication of Norwegianreform and Year, it will be the main vari-
able of interest in estimating the potential causal impact of
Norway’s prostitution law reform. Fourth, all economic controls are
excluded, because they increase the value of R2 to 1.143
V. RESULTS
A. A Brief Overview of Sex Trafficking and Prostitution Laws
We begin by summarizing the dataset to be analyzed. As one
might expect, the vast majority of sex-trafficking victims are female.
In addition to the gender distribution of the main outcome varia-
ble, Figure 1 shows the distribution of the four categories of
prostitution laws in 2010. While all four types of laws are repre-
sented, one is clearly dominant: more than three-quarters of
countries criminalized neither buyers nor sellers. One might think
that broader distribution of PLI scores would have allowed a more
robust analysis, but as the next subpart discusses, the relationships
that are presented still hold when additional, non-EU countries are
included. In the enlarged sample for year 2010, for example, Nor-
way receives a PLI of 4, while Montenegro and Serbia each receive a
1. This increases the variance in the Prostitution Law Index score varia-
ble without changing the mathematical sign of the key coefficients
or rendering insignificant any otherwise statistically significant
result.
143. For more in-depth discussion of this issue, in conjunction with the results of the
regressions analyses, see infra Part V.
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FIGURE 1: DISTRIBUTION OF CATEGORIES OF PROSTITUTION LAWS
AMONG EU MEMBER STATES, 2010
Punishing sellers only Punishing neither
Punishing both Punishing buyers only
Once the number of sex-trafficking victims per capita in each
country for each year of the dataset is computed, the countries may
be divided into four groups according to their prostitution laws.
One can then compute the mean trafficking-prevalence rate to
yield descriptive data on the average prevalence of trafficking in
countries under each of the four prostitution law regimes.
If the theory spelled out in previous subparts is correct, then the
average trafficking prevalence figures should be highest in coun-
tries that punish only sellers and lowest in countries that punish
only buyers. And that is precisely what the figures show. Figure 2
gives the full descriptive results.
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FIGURE 2: AVERAGE NUMBER OF SEX-TRAFFICKING VICTIMS PER
MILLION PEOPLE IN EU MEMBER STATES, SORTED BY

























Punishing sellers only (PLI=1) Punishing neither (PLI=2) Punishing both (PLI=3) Punishing buyers only (PLI=4)
The graph shows that, on average, European Union countries
that punish only buyers of sex (yielding a PLI score of 4) have the
fewest identified sex-trafficking victims per million people. Coun-
tries that punish both sellers and buyers (yielding a PLI score of 3)
have slightly higher rates, but still have substantially lower levels
than countries that punish neither sellers nor buyers (a PLI score of
2). Countries that punish only those who sell sex (a PLI score of 1)
have, on average, the highest prevalence of sex trafficking. In other
words, these merely descriptive results align well with the theoreti-
cal results predicted in Part II. But because these results are merely
descriptive, they do not yield any good explanation for the appar-
ent correlation between prostitution laws and sex trafficking, and
whether such a relationship should be attributed to prostitution
laws or to some other factor not included in the figure. The follow-
ing analysis thus digs deeper into the nature of the relationship
between sex trafficking and prostitution laws. Table 5 shows the
variables used, along with their full quantitative definitions; the list
includes the two dependent variables, the main independent varia-
ble, and a host of control variables.
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TABLE 5: VARIABLES AND DEFINITIONS
Variable name Description
Sex trafficking The main dependent variable, which measures the identified
and presumed number of sex trafficking victims per million
people in a given country in a given year.
Human trafficking The alternative dependent variable, which measures the
identified and presumed number of human trafficking vic-
tims per million people in a given country in a given year.
Prostitution Law The main independent variable, measuring on a four-point
Index score scale the extent to which a country’s prostitution laws are
expected to reduce the prevalence of sex trafficking.
Democracy An aggregate measure of democracy based on the “polity2”
variable in the Polity IV dataset.
Rule of law A measure of rule of law from the World Governance Indica-
tors.
Population Total population in millions of people.
Population density Number of inhabitants per km2.
Urbanization Degree of urbanization in percent.
Immigration Size of annual international immigration flows per million
people.
Foreigners Number of foreign-born citizens per million people.
Tourism Number of arrivals of residents/non-residents at tourist
accommodation establishments per million people.
PPP Indexed GDP per capita in purchasing power standards
(PPS). European Union average = 100.
Unemployment Annual average unemployment rate, in percent.
Poverty risk At-risk-of-poverty rate by national poverty threshold, in per-
cent.
Imports The value of annual imports per million people.
Interaction An interaction term based on multiplication of the Differ-
ence-in-Differences intervention variable and a dummy varia-
ble for the post-reform period. In the Difference-in-
Differences specifications, this variable reveals an estimate of
the potential causal effect of the implementation of the
Demand Model in Norway. As such, this is the main variable
of interest.
As previously explained, the variables Sex trafficking and Human
trafficking are used in separate analyses, in order to improve the ro-
bustness of the results. Since the European Union has gathered
more data on human trafficking than on sex trafficking, there are
fewer missing observations for the Human trafficking variable. Table
6 shows summary statistics for the variables listed in Table 5.
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TABLE 6: SUMMARY STATISTICS
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Sex trafficking 11.23 12.98 0.29 65.88
Human trafficking 18.73 23.54 0.75 141.80
Prostitution Law 2.1 0.54 1 4
Index score
Democracy 9.56 0.76 8 10
Rule of law 1.28 0.58 –0.16 1.98
Population 19.79 25.13 0.48 82.21
Population density 144.24 118.11 17.5 492.2
Urbanization 40.67 13.73 17.8 68
Immigration 9449 7873.28 161.78 36705.32
Foreigners 87407.97 100471.4 1212.34 435355.6
Tourism 818180.7 509959.1 98084.71 1978526
PPP 107.22 46.61 44 264
Unemployment 8.13 3.98 3.1 20.1
Poverty risk 14.75 4.18 8.6 26.4
Imports 11585.55 9315.6 1811.65 45192.32
Interaction 0.25 0.45 0 1
B. The Inverse Relationship between Prostitution Law Index Scores and
Prevalence of Sex Trafficking and Human Trafficking
As highlighted above, the theoretical framework developed in
this Article predicts that Prostitution Law Index scores and the
prevalence of sex trafficking will stand in an inverse relationship.
Figure 3 demonstrates the negative linear relationship between sex
trafficking and Prostitution Law Index scores for all countries in the
main sample (EU member states only) between 2008 and 2010. It
therefore includes multiple observations for individual countries.
The figure shows that countries with laws that are expected to in-
crease replacement, increase substitution, or decrease scale had, on
average, a lower prevalence of sex trafficking between 2008 and
2010—just as the theory developed in Part II predicts.
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Note that the data points have been slightly spread out using a graphic function called “jitter”
in order to make the graph visually easier to interpret. Since the horizontal axis is repre-
sented by a four-point scale, the observations would otherwise be stacked on top of each
other. Importantly, “jittering” the data points does not affect the trend line in any way, in-
cluding its direction and magnitude.
Table 7 provides the results from a cross-sectional analysis of the
relationship between sex trafficking and prostitution laws. Column
(1) shows the regression output for the linear relationship depicted
in Figure 3. The negative coefficient of –6.43 suggests that a 1-point
increase in the Prostitution Law Index score of a given European
Union member state is associated with a lower prevalence of sex
trafficking, which corresponds to, on average, roughly six fewer sex-
trafficking victims per million people. The effect is statistically sig-
nificant at the one percent level. The effect size is relatively
substantial, considering that the average number of sex trafficking
victims per million people is about eleven, and that Prostitution
Law Index scores—as opposed to the binary variables typical in the
existing literature—are based on a four-point scale, allowing for
greater increases and decreases. Still, this finding should be inter-
preted with great caution, both because gathering reliable and
comparable data on trafficking is so difficult and because this result
demonstrates only correlation, not any form of causation.
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TABLE 7: SEX TRAFFICKING AND PROSTITUTION LAWS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Prostitution Law –6.43*** –6.50*** –5.90** –6.49 –7.87
Index score (1.67) (1.74) (2.63) (4.61) (5.10)
Time fixed effects NO YES YES YES YES
Political controls NO NO YES YES YES
Geographic controls NO NO NO YES YES
Economic controls NO NO NO NO YES
R2 0.08 0.10 0.17 0.64 0.67
Number of countries 22 22 21 20 20
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Robust (clustered) standard errors in parentheses. Politi-
cal controls include Democracy and Rule of law. Geographic controls include Population,
Population density, Urbanization, Immigration, Foreigners, and Tourism. Economic controls in-
clude PPP, Unemployment, Poverty risk, and Imports.
Column (2) adds time-fixed effects, to control for unobservable
characteristics that vary across time but remain constant across
countries. Ideally, country-fixed effects should also be used, to cap-
ture unobservable characteristics that vary across countries but are
constant across time. Due to the lack of variation in prostitution
laws for any given country between 2008 and 2010, however, coun-
try-fixed effects are excluded; in any case, such an analysis would
not yield meaningful results in the instant case.144
Column (3) adds a set of political variables as controls. Democra-
cies may have better institutions and thus be better able to fight
trafficking. Rule of law is also expected to be negatively correlated
with sex trafficking, since traffickers under the rule of law might be
likely to face a higher risk of prosecution. The size of the coefficient
for Prostitution Law Index scores is smaller than in previous col-
umns and the standard error is slightly larger, but the relationship
is still significant at the five percent level. Column (4) adds control
variables with geographic characteristics. Population, population
density, and urbanization capture potential interactions between
people; in countries where any of these measures is high, there may
be a relatively higher prevalence of sex trafficking. Immigration
flows, the stock of immigrants, and tourism may also potentially be
correlated with sex trafficking. When controlling for time-fixed ef-
fects, political variables, and geographic controls, the coefficient is
no longer significant, because of the relatively large standard error.
144. A separate analysis with country-fixed effects added to the specification in Column
(1) found that the inverse relationship between human trafficking and Prostitution Law In-
dex scores held for European Union member states as well as for European Union member
and candidate states. By contrast, the corresponding results for sex trafficking and Prostitu-
tion Law Index scores were insignificant.
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Finally, Column (5) adds economic variables to the regression.
On an international level, poorer countries may experience lower
sex trafficking because of poorer consumers and hence lower po-
tential revenues for traffickers. But in the European Union, where
most countries are rich, one might expect PPP per capita to be neg-
atively correlated with sex trafficking, implying that this form of
exploitation is generally more common in poorer countries, per-
haps because the government has fewer resources to spend on anti-
trafficking efforts. Higher unemployment may also make prostitu-
tion a more lucrative business, which could increase sex trafficking
if it attracts traffickers looking for vulnerable individuals to exploit,
or decrease trafficking if voluntary prostitutes crowd out trafficking
victims from the market. The risk of poverty is included for similar
reasons. Finally, imports are controlled for, as they tend to indicate
the openness of a country and could therefore potentially be corre-
lated with trafficking flows. The size of the coefficient for
Prostitution Law Index scores in this column is larger than in any of
the other specifications. But so, too, is the standard error, and
hence the primary relationship of interest, the relationship between
sex trafficking and prostitution laws, is not significant.
Since the relationship between sex trafficking and Prostitution
Law Index scores is significant in three out of five tests, it appears
that higher PLI scores may be associated with, on average, lower
levels of sex trafficking. But there is also a great deal of unex-
plained variation in the data. The coefficients in Columns (4) and
(5) are, as stated, relatively large, but there is a one-sixth reduction
in the number of observations, which contributes in part to the
much larger standard errors and lack of statistical significance.
It cannot be emphasized enough that the results must be viewed
with great caution, given both the lack of reliable data on human
and sex trafficking and the many caveats associated with the EU
trafficking dataset. That said, it seems that categorizing prostitution
laws according to this Article’s basic theoretical framework regard-
ing expected effectiveness in tackling sex trafficking may have some
analytical purchase. This Article may indicate that it could be fruit-
ful in subsequent quantitative research to try to study a greater
variation of prostitution laws.145
145. This conclusion further supported by additional regression specifications with
dummy variables for each of the four categories. These tests show, for instance, that com-
pared with punishing neither buyers nor sellers (PLI = 2), only punishing sellers (PLI = 1) is
associated with, on average, higher levels of sex trafficking, whereas punishing both sellers
and buyers (PLI = 3) is associated with, on average, lower levels of sex trafficking.
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Because it is so hard to find reliable data on sex trafficking, data
on human trafficking can be used as a robustness check. To the
extent that sex trafficking and human trafficking are correlated, the
latter can serve as a proxy for the former, especially in this case.
Looking at human trafficking rather than sex trafficking allows for
an analysis that encompasses many more data points, which in-
creases the statistical power of the analysis. If the relationships
between prostitution laws and the two types of trafficking are both
significant, the results should probably be interpreted as a bit more
robust. Including data on human trafficking as a robustness check
also brings the additional benefit of being able to check for any
potential spillover effect.146
Table 8 repeats the regression specifications in Table 7, with the
only difference being the outcome variable; instead of (identified
and presumed) sex-trafficking victims per million people, the out-
come variable is now (identified and presumed) human-trafficking
victims per million people.147
TABLE 8: PROSTITUTION LAWS AND (ALL FORMS OF) HUMAN
TRAFFICKING
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Prostitution Law –13.69*** –13.63*** –12.86** –13.12*** –10.79**
Index score (4.40) (4.46) (5.11) (3.42) (4.44)
Time fixed effects NO YES YES YES YES
Political controls NO NO YES YES YES
Geographic controls NO NO NO YES YES
Economic controls NO NO NO NO YES
R2 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.52 0.60
Number of countries 28 28 27 26 26
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Robust (clustered) standard errors in parentheses.
Political controls include democracy and rule of law. Geographic controls include popula-
tion, population density, urbanization, immigration, foreigners, and tourism. Economic
controls include PPP, unemployment, poverty risk, and imports.
146. If sex trafficking becomes less prevalent and the ratio of costs and benefits changes
(so that it becomes more beneficial to traffickers to sell labor, for example, rather than sex-
ual services), one would expect to see increases in labor trafficking appearing alongside
decreases in sex trafficking. This negative spillover effect could cancel out, or even exceed,
any decrease in sex trafficking. One would see a mere shift in the composition of human
trafficking, without any overall reduction in human trafficking. If the results were significant
for both sex trafficking and human trafficking as outcome variables, by contrast, then there
would be less reason to worry about either the risk of bad data on sex trafficking or the risk of
a negative spillover effect. See supra Part III.A (discussing spillover effects).
147. As stated earlier, sex trafficking is a subset of human trafficking, and the coefficients
are therefore expected to be larger when human trafficking is analyzed.
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All five regression specifications are statistically significant, and
they suggest that a one-point increase in the Prostitution Law Index
score of a given European Union country is associated with a lower
prevalence of human trafficking, equivalent to about eleven to thir-
teen victims per million people in that country. This suggests that
any negative spillover effect from targeting sex trafficking through
a higher PLI score, if it exists at all, may be relatively limited: the
results imply that higher PLI scores, lower prevalence of sex traf-
ficking, and lower prevalence of human trafficking are all to some
extent correlated.
More specifically, the results in Columns (1) to (5) are signifi-
cant at the five percent level or the one percent level. These results
are in line with the results of the sex trafficking analyses in Table 7,
although they are notably more consistent in their statistical signifi-
cance than are the sex trafficking results. There are at least three
reasons why the link between human trafficking and PLI scores ap-
pears more statistically significant than the link between sex
trafficking and PLI scores.
First, the relationship between human trafficking and Prostitu-
tion Law Index scores may simply be stronger than the relationship
between sex trafficking and Prostitution Law Index scores. Second,
the discrepancy could be a result of the simple fact that less data is
available on sex trafficking than on human trafficking, which could
help explain why the standard errors in the human trafficking anal-
yses in Columns (4) and (5) of Table 8 are smaller than those in
the corresponding columns for sex trafficking in Table 7, even
though the effect sizes are larger in the former. Third, the quality
of the data on sex trafficking may be worse than the data on human
trafficking (indeed, this was one of the arguments that was raised in
favor of including data on total human trafficking as a robustness
check148). Further research is needed to uncover which of these
three reasons, if any, best explains the differences between sex traf-
ficking and PLI scores, on the one hand, and human trafficking
and PLI scores, on the other.
It may be fruitfully noted, in closing, that the basic conclusion
holds even as one moves slightly beyond the borders of the EU. The
results in Tables 7 and 8 remain valid for larger samples, such as the
prevalence of sex trafficking and all human trafficking in the EU,
plus some of the European countries that are not presently mem-
ber states (e.g. Norway, Serbia, and Montenegro).
As stated, however, these analyses speak only to correlation, not
causation; from these results alone, one cannot infer that changes
148. See supra Part III.A (discussing the merits of using human trafficking data).
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to prostitution laws will, in fact, bring about an increase or decrease
in sex trafficking. The next subpart will therefore complement the
results presented thus far by providing some very tentative estimates
of the potential causal impact of Norway’s 2009 implementation of
the Demand Model.
C. Suggestive Estimates of the Causal Effect of the Demand Model on Sex
Trafficking and Human Trafficking in Norway
In 2009, Norway followed Sweden’s approach to prostitution and
made the act of buying sex illegal while still permitting the act of
selling sex. To tentatively estimate what, if any, causal impact the
implementation of the Demand Model may have had on the preva-
lence of sex trafficking in the country, this Article deploys a
Difference-in-Differences model.149 The primary result suggests that
the Model may possibly have led to a reduction in trafficking, but
because of the extremely limited dataset, the most valuable implica-
tion of this exercise is likely to be the analytical approach (using
Difference-in-Differences to study prostitution laws and trafficking),
rather than the statistical finding in itself.
The main variable of interest is the interaction term based on the
intervention variable and the pre-post variable. As previously ex-
plained, the intervention variable separates Norway from three
other Nordic countries and the pre-post variable indicates whether
a given year was before or after the Norwegian reform came into
effect. The coefficient on the interaction variable is thus the esti-
mated potential causal impact of introducing the Demand Model in
Norway. As in the preceding subpart, human trafficking is again
used as a robustness check.
Table 9 displays the results. This Differences-in-Differences analy-
sis uses the same control variables as the previous analyses, with a
few exceptions. Democracy is removed because all countries have the
same score, underlining the fact that these Nordic countries are
fairly similar, making a Difference-in-Differences analysis more
149. To reiterate, the purpose of a Difference-in-Differences analysis is to compare the
change over time in an outcome variable for a certain group exposed to a given policy inter-
vention with the change over time in the same outcome variable for a different group that
was not exposed to the policy. In other words, the result of interest is the difference in the
differences (or changes). As previously discussed, a valid Difference-in-Differences analysis
crucially depends on the assumption that the changes in the two groups would have been
identical (or at least highly similar) had it not been for the policy. If this assumption holds,
then the resulting difference in the two time trends can be properly ascribed to the policy
intervention.
WINTER 2017] Curbing Sex Trafficking 381
likely to be suitable. The number of tourists has to be omitted be-
cause the relevant information is missing data for all three years for
Norway. Also omitted are the economic controls (PPP, unemploy-
ment, poverty risk, and imports), because R2 reaches 1.00 when
they are included, thereby rendering the analysis less
meaningful.150
TABLE 9: ESTIMATES OF THE CAUSAL IMPACT OF INTRODUCING THE
DEMAND MODEL IN NORWAY
Human Human Human
Sex traf- Sex traf- Sex traf- traffick- traffick- traffick-
ficking ficking ficking ing ing ing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Effect of introducing –4.06* –8.03*** –8.52*** –5.86** –3.92 –4.77**
Demand Model (1.54) (0.74) (0.75) (1.45) (2.00) (1.10)
Political controls NO YES YES NO YES YES
Geographic controls NO NO YES NO NO YES
R2 0.45 0.69 0.93 0.46 0.50 0.98
Number of countries 4 4 4 4 4 4
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Robust (clustered) standard errors in parentheses.
Political controls include democracy and rule of law. Geographic controls include popula-
tion, population density, urbanization, immigration, foreigners, and tourism.
Excepting the specification in Column (5), all of the results are
statistically significant to at least some extent, irrespective both of
control variables and of whether sex trafficking or human traffick-
ing is the dependent variable. But their significance levels vary, and
it is questionable whether the significance tests make much sense
with such an exceptionally limited sample. Indeed, one might want
to look at the findings without paying attention to the significance
levels. Nonetheless, they are reported here as they may be of inter-
est to the reader. But the results should by no means be interpreted
as evidence of a causal effect of the Demand Model—that would be
highly inappropriate.
The estimated point estimates in Columns (1) to (6) range from
about, on average, four to eight fewer trafficking victims per million
inhabitants per year in Norway compared with in the other Nordic
150. The R2 denotes the proportion of the dependent variable’s variation that is ex-
plained by a linear regression model. A high value thus indicates that the independent
variables have high explanatory power, which could also indicate that the entities studied are
similar along the explanatory factors. The fact that R2 reaches 1.00 further underlines the
fact that these countries are very similar, which, again, supports the feasibility of the method-
ological approach. However, it also indicates that the number of observations is extremely
small, which further demonstrates that the results should be interpreted with great caution.
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countries that are used as a comparison group. This suggests, as-
suming that the Difference-in-Differences model actually is feasible,
that trafficking levels might possibly have been lower than they
would otherwise have been if Norway had not introduced the De-
mand Model.
As previously discussed,151 the validity of these results depends on
the parallel-trends assumption. If that assumption does not hold
(an issue that future researchers should investigate further), then
the results are erroneous. The European Union has not yet gath-
ered sufficient data to reliably establish time trends prior to the
implementation of the 2009 reform.
What is already possible, however, is to do a qualitative compari-
son of the countries. These four Nordic countries share a common
history and have similar cultures. In global rankings—whether ac-
cording to levels of democracy, rule of law, gender equality, or
wealth—the Nordic countries usually end up very close to each
other.152 Because of the many similarities among these countries, it
may be difficult to think of reasons why the countries would have
significantly different trends in trafficking.153 This bolsters the
argument for using a Difference-in-Differences analysis with three
other Nordic countries as comparison countries.154
151. See supra Part IV.B.
152. See The Nordic Countries: The Next Supermodel, THE ECONOMIST (Feb. 2, 2013), http://
www.economist.com/news/leaders/21571136-politicians-both-right-and-left-could-learn-nor-
dic-countries-next-supermodel; Lessons: The Secret of their success, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 31,
2013, 4:02 PM), http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21570835-nordic-coun-
tries-are-probably-best-governed-world-secret-their.
153. One might argue that Norway stands out because it is not a member of the EU,
which potentially could have some impact on trends in trafficking. But that argument would
miss two important points. First, a substantial part of sex trafficking in the EU’s member
states is based on trafficking flows from other countries, and since Norway is a member of the
Schengen Area the country already participates in the abolishment of internal borders
among European nations. See EUROPEAN COMM’N, Schengen Area, MIGRATION AND HOME AFF.,
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/schengen/
index_en.htm (last updated Jan. 29, 2016). Second, even though Norway is not a full mem-
ber of the EU, it is bound by much of the Union’s legislation. See Espen Barth Eide, We Pay,
But Have No Say: That’s the Reality of Norway’s Relationship with the EU, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 27,
2015, 3:50 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/oct/27/norway-eu-re-
ality-uk-voters-seduced-by-norwegian-model (“[Norway has] incorporated approximately
three-quarters of all EU legislative acts into Norwegian legislation – and counting. We have
legally secured access to the single market, and we practise the free movement of people,
goods, services and capital. Norway is more closely integrated into many aspects of the EU
than even some of the EU’s members. Our subscription to freedom of movement and our
membership of the Schengen area means that Norway has even higher per capita immigra-
tion than Britain.”).
154. One might object that Finland is substantially different from Norway, Sweden, and
Denmark, for both historical and cultural reasons. The Finnish language, for instance, is
from an entirely different language family, while Norwegian, Swedish, and Danish are very
close relatives in the Indo-European family tree. It should therefore be noted that the results
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There are reasons why Difference-in-Differences estimators (in
general; not necessarily using this particular dataset) may correctly
identify a causal impact of the implementation of the Demand
Model in Norway in 2009. Still, the results in this Article should still
be interpreted with great caution due to the limited data on traf-
ficking that is presently available. Hence, the findings are better
seen as pointing out directions for future research on this topic
rather than as constituting evidence on any causal effect of the De-
mand Model. Because the trafficking data is so limited over time,
more reservations must be made concerning the below results than
are typical in Difference-in-Differences analyses.155
As far as the author is aware, this Article marks the first attempt
to use empirical evidence to study the effect of the Norwegian pros-
titution law reform on sex trafficking by using a quasi-experimental
framework. Further research can shore up the Article’s findings. It
could be, for example, that the apparent change in trafficking prev-
alence in Norway was caused, in whole or in part, by another, as-yet-
unspecified variable, such as police resources, social programs, law
enforcement efforts, or political prioritization. Qualitative research
on efforts to curb trafficking prior to and after the Norwegian re-
form should help shed light on this question.
Another issue, as previously mentioned, is that good data on traf-
ficking is exceedingly hard to come by. It is of course possible that
the recent dataset used in this Article is inaccurate and does not
well reflect trafficking prevalence in the countries in question.
While this is a concern that is common to almost every study based
on quantitative data, a reiterated note of caution is especially perti-
nent here. Prostitution laws and sex trafficking are hot-button
issues both in academic and public debate, and no single study can
provide conclusive evidence on how the two are related to each
other across the globe, or even within a region or a single country.
in Table 9 were found to be statistically significant even when Finland was excluded from the
analysis.
155. For more typical Difference-in-Difference analyses, with much more data and there-
fore substantially more robust results, see, e.g., Harold Alderman  et al., Effectiveness of a
community-based intervention to improve nutrition in young children in Senegal: a difference in differ-
ence analysis, 12 PUB. HEALTH NUTRITION 667 (2009);  Kimberly Singer Babiarz et al., New
evidence on the impact of China’s New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme and its implications for rural
primary healthcare: multivariate difference-in-difference analysis, THE BMJ (Oct. 21, 2010), http://
www.bmj.com/content/341/bmj.c5617.long; Matthew J. Slaughter, Trade liberalization and per
capita income convergence: a difference-in-differences analysis, 55 J. INT’L ECON. 203.
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Investigating to what extent this European Union dataset is accu-
rate and representative is therefore also an important task for
future research.156
CONCLUSION
This Article attempted to make three contributions to the litera-
ture on the relationship between sex trafficking and prostitution
laws. First, it proposed a basic theoretical framework for analyzing
that relationship, a framework that incorporated three major ef-
fects on trafficking in the market for prostitution: scale,
substitution, and replacement. The Article then used this frame-
work to construct a simple ordinal measure of prostitution laws, the
Prostitution Law Index. The Index ranked countries according to
how well their prostitution laws should combat the prevalence of
sex trafficking, on the basis of the theoretical framework and sev-
eral additional assumptions.
Second, the Article used recent data from the European Union
to analyze the relationship between countries’ Prostitution Law In-
dex scores and the levels of trafficking within their borders. The
results suggested that there generally appears to exist an inverse
relationship between Prostitution Law Index scores and the preva-
lence of both sex trafficking and human trafficking, which is what
the theoretical part of the Article predicted. This implies that legis-
lation that seeks to decrease the scale effect and to increase both
the substitution effect and the replacement effect in the market for
prostitution may possibly have a role to play in anti-trafficking ef-
forts, but only if subsequent research finds that this statistical
relationship is actually causative, as opposed to merely correlative,
in nature.
Third, the Article used a Difference-in-Differences analysis, with
extremely limited data, to provide some initial and tentative esti-
mates of a possible causal effect of Norway’s recent introduction of
the Demand Model. Using Sweden, Denmark, and Finland as a
comparison group, the analysis of the Norwegian data, limited
though it is, provided results indicating that the Norwegian prosti-
tution law reform may potentially have helped reduce sex
trafficking and human trafficking in the country.
156. The EU is currently working on gathering trafficking data for more recent years.
One ought to keep an eye out for likely revisions of the existing estimates, allowing for analy-
ses similar to that presented in this Article but using data that is more up-to-date and perhaps
also more reliable.
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While most of the results were statistically significant (albeit at
different levels of significance), it is important to underscore that
they should nonetheless be interpreted with great caution. The the-
oretical results in particular are based on multiple assumptions that
are hard to confirm or disprove, above all because of a simple lack
of evidence. And because all data on trafficking is somewhat unreli-
able to begin with, the empirical results are not as strong as one
would wish. In addition, the supposedly harmonized data-collection
methods that the European Union is attempting to develop and
deploy are still very much in the testing phase, and will likely un-
dergo major tweaking in the future. The data used in this Article
will probably be revised many times, and the results are thus likely
to change as better data becomes available. Moreover, the time pe-
riod for which data was available to this Article is very limited,
covering a mere three years. Such narrow scope further limits the
empirical reach of the Article. Perhaps the least troublesome results
in the Article are those that study the relationship between Prostitu-
tion Law Index scores and all forms of human trafficking, both
because those are based on the largest number of observations and
because they were all statistically significant. Yet, these results only
capture correlation, and thus regrettably leave out any conclusions
about potential causal effects.
What is needed now is more research, both quantitative and
qualitative. Quantitative research, by using methods both similar
to157 and different from the ones used here, can help confirm or
reject the existence of a statistical relationship between Prostitution
Law Index scores and sex trafficking, and can help delineate the
possible effect that adopting the Demand Model may have on re-
ducing sex trafficking. Second, qualitative research can help shed
light on the validity of the parallel-trends assumption made in the
Difference-in-Differences analysis of the Norwegian prostitution law
reform. For if the parallel-trends assumption fails to hold, then this
Article’s approach would not constitute a sound method for study-
ing the Demand Model and its potential impact on trafficking in
Norway. Qualitative research, particularly interviews with partici-
pants in the market for prostitution, may shed light on the
existence and relevance of substitution and replacement effects.
Third, while potentially building on this Article’s idea of approach-
ing prostitution laws as a non-binary phenomenon, it may be
worthwhile for future research to look at some of the factors that
157. The author strongly believes that the use of quasi-experimental methods, like the
Difference-in-Differences framework used in this Article, has great potential to bear fruit in
subsequent studies of prostitution laws and/or sex trafficking.
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were beyond the scope of the instant analysis, including legislation
related to pimping and brothel-owning, as well as the severity of
punishment for violations of different prostitution laws.158 Fourth,
the aforementioned additional considerations for policymakers
seeking to address prostitution laws, besides trafficking, must not be
forgotten. Issues such as violence against sellers, individual auton-
omy of sellers, health risks, and the general welfare of voluntary
sellers are also very important to study.
The theoretical and statistical analyses presented in this Article
suggest that it may be possible for a country, in some instances, to
reduce sex trafficking by reforming its prostitution laws, perhaps by
introducing reforms that produce a positive replacement effect, a
positive substitution effect, or a negative scale effect in the market
for prostitution. If the results in this Article were to hold up to fu-
ture scrutiny, they will likely have some implications for
policymaking.
Bearing the analytical caveats in mind, the hope is that the gen-
eral theoretical framework and overall methodological approaches
this Article has presented will contribute to the academic debate on
creative ways to think about prostitution laws and to study how dif-
ferent types of legal reform may help combat sex trafficking, a
major scourge of our time.
158. This may be of particular interest since the severity of punishment tends to vary
greatly across different jurisdictions.
